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1Abstract
The thesis is composed of three essays on auction theory. The focus is mainly on 
the English auction, which is probably the format most commonly used. In the English 
auction, a bidder can see his opponents’ activity as the price is gradually raised starting 
from a very low price. When only one bidder is left, such bidder is declared the winner 
and pays the price at which the last but one bidder exited. The vast majority of the 
studies assume that the price is raised continuously and that a bidder cannot outbid the 
current winner by a discrete amount, or to use the terminology employed in the literature 
to place a jump bid. Such a restriction is often unrealistic and examples of jump bidding 
can be found in many relevant contexts. In the first two chapters, we analyze settings in 
which jump bidding is allowed. Previous studies suggest that the possibility of placing 
a jump bid can be used to signal one’s strength and induce the opponents to quit (on 
average) earlier than they would have otherwise.
In our first paper we follow this approach. In particular, as Fishman (1988), we 
assume that the purpose of signalling is to discourage the opponents from acquiring 
finer information regarding their valuations. As opposed to Fishman (1988), we look 
at an environment where bidders’ valuations are determined not only by a private (as 
he does) but also a common value element. We show that the presence of a common 
element makes jump bidding harder. Secondly, we prove that when the bidder placing 
the jump knows his total value but not the relative importance of the common value 
part, a jump bidding equilibrium can be sustained more often and it yields higher profits 
than when the bidder knows exactly such value.
In the second paper, we introduce a different and new rational for jump bidding, 
which involves no signalling or information costs. In an interdependent value setting, 
where a bidder’s value depends on the valuation of the other bidders, it is crucial whether 
a bidder’s exit price is known or not. Jump bidding offers the possibility of hiding the 
exit value of some opponent, thus affecting the expected value of the remaining bidders 
and ultimately their bidding behaviour. We illustrate when hiding such information 
might be profitable. We also show that its effect both on revenues and efficiency is in 
general ambiguous.
Finally, in the last paper (joint work with Hernando-Veciana) we contribute to the 
important issue of determining which is the most efficient way to allocate an object 
among a set of potential buyers. Previous studies provide both conditions under which 
it is possible to allocate the object to the buyer with the highest willingness to pay (First
2Best), and mechanisms that can implement such an allocation. We characterize the most 
efficient allocation when the First Best cannot be implemented. Then, we study whether 
the English auction can implement it. While an equilibrium of the English Auction that 
implements the Second Best exists, it is in general not robust if there are more than two 
bidders.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Auction theory has been one of the most successful and prolific areas of economic theory 
in the last thirty years. The theoretical guidelines that have been developed have proven 
to be important in helping practitioners improve the design of the auction mechanisms 
used in practice. The relevance of the practical applications, together with the fact that 
the theoretical tools developed can be employed for applications rather than auctions, 
is probably one of the key factors behind the popularity of this field.
The thesis is composed of three chapters. All chapters focus on frameworks where 
there is only a single object for sale and the mechanism used is an English auction. In 
the last chapter we also solve a more general theoretical problem concerning the issue 
of determining the allocation that maximizes social welfare when it is not possible to 
achieve the first best.
The single object framework is relatively simpler to analyze compared to the multi­
object one. For this reason it has been the first to be analyzed and the one that has 
received more coverage to date. Among the auction formats, the English auction is 
probably the one most used in practice and many studies have already pointed out the 
advantages and disadvantages of this format. In the English auction the seller or the 
auctioneer announces a starting price, which is then raised until only one of the bidders 
is still active. That bidder wins the object and pays the price at which his last opponent 
exited the auction. Such type of format is called open format, referring to the feature 
that bidders typically see the opponents’ activity during the auction.
We believe that even though many previous studies had as focus the single-object 
English auction, some of its key features have received too little attention. We aim to 
contribute covering some of these gaps.
In particular, most of the studies have made some restrictive modeling assumptions
6
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and/or imposed conditions on bidders’ valuations that have enabled to look at ” well- 
behaved” and regular problems and to provide nice clear-cut results in terms of the 
analysis of the revenues and efficiency properties of the auction and in terms of the 
comparison with alternative formats. In this type of studies the English auction is often 
praised as under the circumstances imposed it generates higher revenues and/or provides 
an efficient allocation. This is generally due to the fact that the English auction being 
an open format allows the bidders to aggregate extra information in the course of the 
auction. The conditions that are normally imposed guarantee that such information 
aggregation happens in a ’’smooth” way. Conversely, we look at settings where the 
aggregation of information may not be smooth or bidders may have incentives to affect 
the information that can be aggregated in the auction. The environments we look at are 
more complexes. Thus the price we need to pay especially in the first two chapters for 
looking at less regular problems is that we need to focus on more specific settings.
One of the restrictions normally introduced in the modeling stage is to look at the 
so-called Japanese version of the English Auction described by Milgrom and Weber 
(1982). In this variant of the English auction some exogenous device exogenously and 
continuously raises the price. This greatly simplifies the analysis as it limits the set of 
possible actions that can be taken by a bidder to the relatively simple decision of staying 
active or to quit at the current price. In real auctions, however, the price is typically 
raised either by the bidders or by the seller through discontinuous increments. Such a 
feature is one of the key elements that distinguish an open format from a sealed one as 
it allows the bidders to communicate through the bids they place.
In the first two chapters we look at frameworks where bidders can outbid the current 
winner by a discrete amount or, to use the terminology employed in the literature, to 
jump bid.
The first chapter follows Fishman’s (1988) insight that a bidder may jump bid in order 
to deter an opponent from (costly) acquiring finer information regarding his valuation. 
Such information may render the opponent more competitive. Thus, a jump bid can 
be used to signal one’s strength to prevent the opponent from investing resources in 
acquiring information when the chances of winning with a congruous return would be 
small. Fishman’s paper is set to explain the takeover premium that is often observed in 
takeover contests. The framework he uses is a two-bidder independent private model in 
which one of the two bidders knows his valuation, while the other does not. If the former 
draws a sufficiently high type, he places a pre-emptive bid that forecloses competition 
from the opponent. We follow closely his setting so that we can derive his model as a
CHAPTER1. INTRODUCTION 8
special case of ours and exploit it as a benchmark. Our interest is to study whether 
and to what extent a bidder with finer information over a common value component 
can use jump bidding to increase his informational rent. We also look at a two-bidder 
setting but we assume that bidders’ valuations are a mix of a private and a common 
element. Our setting is justified by the observation that in most of the applications 
the finer information a bidder can achieve is not of a pure private nature, but rather it 
affects the opponents values as well. In the takeover application for instance a bidder 
may get a better estimate regarding the quantity or the quality of some assets the 
target holds. Such information normally contains some common value element. A first 
result is that when a common value element is present it is harder to profitably jump 
bid and the profits of the better-informed bidder are reduced compared to the private 
value case. The larger the relative size of the common value element, the lower the 
probability of observing a jump bid. The intuition is that now a one-dimensional signal 
(the price) conveys information about a two-dimensional type (given by the private and 
common component). A higher price signals a higher value, but it also induces an 
upward updating of the probability of a better realization of the common value element. 
The second effect does not deter competition; rather it works in the opposite direction 
than the one desired by the informed bidder. In fact, a higher bid does not need to 
more strongly deter the opponent. The second main result lies in the comparison of two 
different informational settings: in one we assume that the informed bidder gets to know 
both the private and the common value signal; in the other, that he gets only an aggregate 
signal about his valuation. We show that informed bidder prefers to receive only the 
aggregate information, so that more information does harm the bidder in this contest. 
Finally, we discuss the relation between jump bidding and information acquisition. We 
argue that the higher profits allowed by jump bidding maybe a necessary rent to leave 
to a bidder. Otherwise, it may be that no bidder invests in information with a possible 
loss both in revenues and efficiency.
In the second chapter, we continue to look at a model where jump bidding can arise 
in equilibrium. Contrary to all previous models in the small literature on jump bid­
ding (with exception of an independent work by Ettinger (2006)), we introduce a new 
explanation that is not based on a signaling story. The rational we propose is based 
on a hiding information motivation: a jump may be placed to hide to the opponents 
some valuable information. The information that can be hidden is the exact exit value 
of some of the opponents. In an interdependent value setting, the valuation of a bidder 
depends also on the valuations of the other bidders. By discretely increasing the price,
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the exact exit value of the opponents that do not match the price that has been called 
is not observed. Hence, a bidder receives only a coarser information about some oppo­
nent’s value, which affects his expected valuation and hence his bidding behavior. As 
mentioned, the English auction is often praised because it allows for information aggre­
gation in the course of the auction and thus, under some circumstances guarantees, both 
higher revenues and efficiency compared to other commonly used formats. We point out 
that the bidders may be able to affect the way such information is aggregated in a way 
that is favorable to them. Not considering such a fact may lead to a wrong conclusion 
regarding the revenues (or the efficiency level) that is generated by the format. We show 
that in general the effect of jump bidding on revenues and efficiency is ambiguous.
Finally, in the third chapter we deal with the important question of looking for the 
allocation that maximizes social welfare. In the second part of the paper we check if 
such an allocation can be implemented using the English auction. The previous work on 
efficient auctions has mainly looked for conditions under which it is possible to always 
allocate the object for sale to the bidder with the highest valuation (First Best) and then 
looked for mechanism that could achieve such an allocation. The necessary condition for 
the first best to be implementable is a technical single crossing condition. Essentially, 
what the condition requires is that the impact of a marginal increase of a bidder’s 
signal on his valuation should be stronger than on the valuation of any other opponent. 
In our paper we provide interesting applications where such conditions are violated, 
such as models with an incumbent and models with negative externalities. Our model 
applies to those settings. Assuming that such a necessary condition holds, Maskin and 
Dasgupta (1992) develops a mechanism that can implement the First Best in general. 
Though theoretically very interesting, their mechanism requires the bidders to submit 
far too much information to be used in practice. Remarkably, with just two bidders 
the necessary condition mentioned above is also sufficient for the English auction to 
implement the First Best (Maskin 1992). A stronger condition is needed with more 
than two bidders (Krishna (2003), Birulin and Izmalkov (2003)). We contribute to 
the literature on efficient auctions in two directions. First, as mentioned we solve the 
problem of determining the efficient allocation when the conditions that are needed for 
the First Best do not hold. That is, we characterize the second best efficient allocation. 
Interestingly, the second best allocation may involve no selling. Second, we focus on the 
English auction. A priori there is no reason to believe that the English auction should 
perform well when the first best cannot be achieved. We show that English auction 
possesses an equilibrium that implements the second best allocation. However, such
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equilibrium is in general robust only for two bidders. For more than two bidders, only 
an equilibrium based on weakly dominated strategies sometimes exists. We suggest that 
in some cases of interest a two-stage English auction can successfully implement the 
second best. On the technical side, our work is related to Myerson (1981). We employ 
the technique he used to characterize the revenue maximizing mechanism in the non­
regular case (which is known as ironing technique) to find the allocation that maximizes 
the expected social surplus.
Chapter 2
Information Acquisition and 
Pre-em ptive bidding
2.1 Introduction
Jump bidding is a widespread phenomenon in open auction formats that consists in 
placing a substantially higher bid than the one that would be sufficient to replace the 
current winning bid.
It can be observed in many different applications, which include pure auction set­
tings as well as other competitive settings that can be modeled as auctions and where 
overbidding a competitor by a large amount is a commonly used procedure.
A well known and economically relevant example of the former ones is the bidding 
behavior in the UMTS spectrum auctions, of the latter ones the bidding that can be 
observed during takeover contests. 1
The standard way to explain bids above the minimum increment is based on a sig­
naling motivation (e.g. Fishman (1988), Avery (1998)). Recently, an alternative ex­
planation has been proposed: Ettinger (2006) and Michelucci (2007a) suggest that a 
bidder might place a jump bid in order to hide the exact drop-out value of some op­
ponent, thus preventing the remaining active bidders from a precise updating of their 
valuations. The fact that the opponents are forced to base their expected values on less 
precise information may favor the bidder placing the jump bid.2
1See for instance, Borgers and Dustmann (2005) for a discussion on jump bidding in the UK UMTS
spectrum auctions, and Fishman (1988) for the takeover application.
2 In an interdependent value setting not observing the exact exit value of some opponent provides a
coarser information with which to update your expected valuation and in turn your bidding behavior.
11
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The present paper follows the standard signaling approach to jump bidding. The 
objective is to understand if and to what extent a bidder with finer information over a 
common value component can use a jump bidding strategy to increase his information 
rent. We are also interested in evaluating how jump bidding affects the incentive to 
acquire information and in turn the format’s revenues and efficiency. We discuss this at 
the end of the paper.
The closest model to ours is Fishman (1988), which is the first one to suggest that
signaling may be used as a pre-emptive device.3 The key element in pre-emptive models
is that one or more bidders can invest to get finer information regarding his (their)
valuation(s). Such information may render the opponent(s) more competitive. Since the
profitability of acquiring information depends on the chances of winning, a bidder may
want to signal to have a high enough valuation to make the acquisition of information
unprofitable.4 The use of such strategies increases the profits of the bidder who places
the jump bid at the expenses of the seller’s revenues. Furthermore, since the objective
of signaling is not to establish oneself as the highest valuation bidder, but rather as a
strong enough one, allowing for jump bidding may also decrease efficiency.
Fishman’s model is set to explain the bidding premium that is observed in takeover
contests, where a traded company is often taken over at a share price which is higher
than the market one.5 The framework is a two-bidder independent private model, in
which one of the two bidders (managers) knows his private value (profits realizable with
the takeover), whereas the other bidder needs to incur a cost to find out.6 If the first
management assesses a high enough valuation for the takeover, an offer at a premium is
made to foreclose competition from the opponent.
We build upon Fishman (1988) work, but we assume that the incumbent has finer
information regarding the mix of a private and a common value element. The formulation
Those studies provide interesting applications where a bidder may profitably decide to hide information.
3It extends to a bidding setting an idea already present in the literature on limit pricing, see for
instance Milgrom and Roberts (1982).
4 This is similar to what happens in the models motivated by the hiding information insight mentioned
above. There, however, no signaling nor costly information acquisition is necessary.
5 Takeover contests fit nicely a theoretical setting that allows for information acquisition because they
may last for a considerably long time, thus giving bidders enough time to acquire extra information. For
an auction where the allocation of the object entails only a very small expected profit, a pre-emptive
cost could be given by the mental effort/time of assessing more precisely ones own preferences.
6The original formulation assumes that also the first bidder needs to incur a cost, but such fact is
redundant for the point made by the paper. The ex-ante distribution from which the second bidder’s
value is drawn is common knowledge.
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chosen allows us to derive his model as a special case of ours and thus to use it as a 
benchmark case. Our setting is motivated by the observation that in most cases the extra 
information that a bidder can acquire is not entirely of private nature. For instance, in 
the takeover application a management may get a more precise information about the 
amount of some assets held by the target, which have a clear market price, but could 
potentially be used with a different return by the two managements.
A first result is that moving from a pure private value setting to a mix of private 
and common values decreases the probability of observing a jump. In other words, the 
introduction of a common value element weakens the incentive to jump bid. The higher 
the relative size of the common component, the less likely that a jump occurs. To get 
some intuition for this result, note that in our model, even though a jump signals a higher 
valuation, it also induces an upward updating of the probability of a better realization 
of the common value element. Essentially, a one dimensional signal (the price) conveys 
information regarding a two dimensional component (the bidder’s private and common 
signal) and the information conveyed regarding the common value component does not 
help to deter the opponent(s) from investing. In fact, it work against it. 7 Increasing 
the relative size of the common value component makes such undesired effect stronger.
We analyze two different settings: one in which the bidder holding finer information is 
not aware of the relative importance of the common component in determining his value 
(partial information); and one in which he is (full information). Our second main insight 
is that in the full information case it is more difficult to place a jump and the informed 
bidder gets on average less profits. We show that the qualitative effect of having the 
informed bidder aware of the size of both the private and the common value component 
is analogous to the one of increasing the relative size of the common component in the 
partial information case. This implies that the informed bidder is better off in the partial 
information case.
Finally, we look a bit closer at how jump bidding affects the incentives to acquire 
information. Fishman’s conclusion is that jump bidding should be banned as anticom­
petitive as it decreases revenues. However, in drawing such conclusion he ignores the 
fact that, if the first bidder has to pay to get the finer information, he may never invest 
were he not allowed to jump. In other words, we argue that the extra profits that jump 
bidding guarantees may represent a necessary rent to leave to the informed bidder.
Other papers have followed Fishman preemptive insight. Hirshleifer and Png (1989)
7In fact, signaling a higher valuation in this setting may even make a jump that was initially pre­
emptive no longer be such.
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develops a similar model adding the feature that placing a bid is costly. They show 
that the takeover target price is maximized when acquiring information bears a strictly 
positive cost, i.e. when some amount of jump bidding is present in equilibrium. Bhat- 
tacharyya (1992) extends Fishman model to allow for two-sided asymmetric information. 
That is, unlike in Fishman, the second bidder has some initial information that is cor­
related with the one he can get by investing. The additional uncertainty changes the 
equilibrium outcome for a set of intermediate types who now use a strictly increasing bid­
ding function that induces partial pre-emption.8 Bernhardt and Scoones (1993) provides 
an interesting application of pre-emptive bidding to the labour market.
An alternative rationalization of jump bidding based on a signaling motivation is due 
to Avery (1998). He introduces a single object affiliated value framework a la Milgrom 
and Weber (1982) and proposes a pure signaling model that does not need neither costly 
information acquisition nor costly bidding to generate jump bidding. Essentially, a form 
of implicit collusion is initiated via jump bidding. Ex-ante symmetric bidders use one 
or multiple rounds of jumps in order to assess who amongst them is the bidder with 
the highest valuation; then, in the final round, they compete using asymmetric bidding 
strategies that favor the designated winner. Jump bidding in this context does not 
affect efficiency. However, it does increase the profits of the winner at the expense of 
the revenue of the seller.
The model has the advantage of explaining jump bidding in a more general and well 
established setting compared to the ones illustrated earlier. However, it has two main 
drawbacks. First, there is a multiplicity of signaling equilibria. Second, it is not robust 
to perturbations of the last stage of the game, i.e. it is essential that the bidders who are 
not ” designated” as the winner follow exactly the less aggressive equilibrium strategies 
they are assigned.9
Finally, jump bidding may arise if the act of placing a bid is itself costly. Daniel and 
Hirshleifer (1997) shows that in that case jump bidding can be an equilibrium even in 
an independent private value setting where bidders are perfectly informed about their 
valuations. 10
8Whereas low types continue to accommodate and high types to fully pre-empt.
9We believe that the idea of jump bidding as a way to collusively determine the allocation would fit
better a multi-object setting as there a deviation from the accommodating bidding strategy on one item
can be punished by a more aggressive bidding on the item that is selected to be assigned to the deviator.
10In this regard, let us point out that jump bidding can take place even in a non signaling model.
Suppose in fact that in an IPV model it is costly to bid only for one of the bidders (equivalently it could 
be that the bidder is impatient and wants to avoid the cost of waiting longer to close the auction). Then, 
such bidder will make multiple jumps each time equating the cost of the bid to the expected foregone
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Our work is also related to some literature on information acquisition in auctions. 
Compte and Jehiel (2 0 0 2 ) are interested in revenue ranking sealed bid formats against 
dynamic formats in the presence of costly information acquisition.11 Their setting is one 
of independent private values (IPV), where there is one ” special” bidder who can invest 
to discover his exact valuation at any point in the auction and n symmetric bidders that 
cannot. These latter base their bidding strategy on their expected valuation. 12 They 
advocate in favour of dynamic formats as they typically allow to observe the opponents 
exit values and thus the residual demand. This feature enables to assess the chances of 
winning when holding a finer information than in a sealed bid setting, and thus provides 
better incentives to invest, which in turn boosts both revenues and efficiency. 13
Miettinen (2006a) uses the same setting as Compte and Jehiel (2002), but allows 
for jumps. He shows that the informed bidder may jump to discourage the uninformed 
bidder(s) from acquiring information.
Rasmusen (2002) analyses the investment decision aimed at obtaining a finer in­
formation in an open ascending price auction with IPV. His aim is to rationalize why 
bidders may end up spending more than initially planned. He shows that, for some range 
of the investment cost, it is optimal to invest at a later stage and thus revise the initial 
estimate. 14
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents 
and analyses the equilibrium both for the case in which the informed bidder receives only 
the aggregate information and the one in which he receives information regarding both 
signals. Section 4 compares the equilibrium behavior in those two settings. Section 5 
discusses how jump bidding may affect the incentives for information acquisition. Finally, 
section 6  comments on the modeling assumptions made and provides final remarks.
profit of not winning at a price lower than the one posted (the other bidders being infinitely patient use
their weakly dominant strategy to drop when their value is reached).
11 For a related paper, see also Rezende (2001).
12In the published version, Compte and Jehiel (2007), all bidders are ex-ante symmetric, the main 
insights are unchanged.
13 Miettinen (2006b) investigates the incentive to get a finer information in the Dutch auction. He
provides an example in which the Dutch auction outperforms the English auction.
14Hence, estimate revisions may be a perfectly rational phenomena, rather than the consequence of
some emotional effect at play.
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2.2 The M odel
2.2.1 T h e set up
We analyze the following framework. Two players compete in an ascending open English 
auction with a reserve price, vq, and no entry costs, for the allocation of an object. One 
of the them, to which we refer to as F (for First bidder) has an informational advantage 
in that he knows his valuation for the object and can place a first bid, &i, before the 
other bidder, S (for Second bidder), can invest to find out his exact valuation. Bidder S, 
prior to investing, knows only his expected value for the object. The distribution from 
which his exact valuation is drawn is common knowledge since the very beginning, as it 
is the investment cost, cs- As soon as the auction ends, all the uncertainty is resolved.
We assume that bidders’ valuations for the object are given by a mix of a private and 
common component, in particular we represent them by the value function V{ = ti + Q , 
where ti, i = F ,S  is the private value component and Q is the common value one. 
The private signal of bidder i is drawn independently of the one of his opponent from 
a continuous cumulative distribution function with support in [0 , 1], i.e. U ~  F,[0 , 1]. 
The common value component is taken to have a pointwise distribution; more specifically, 
we assume that Q G {0, q}, with Pr(Q = 0) =  Pr(Q = q) = \  and q > 0. Some 
modifications of the basic model are discussed in section VI. Note that we can recover 
Fishman’s framework as a special case of ours setting q = 0.
It is probably instructive to think of the two realizations of Q as states of the world, 
so that we have Q = 0 , as the bad state and Q = q, as the good state. Following this 
interpretation, we can restate that: if Q = 0, players’ valuations are taken from a c.d.f 
with support [0,1], i.e. Vi ~  Fi [0,1], while if Q =  q, players valuations are taken from a 
c.d.f with support [<q, 1 +  q], i.e. Vi ~  Fi [q, 1 +  q].16 Thus, if it is known that vi belongs 
to the interval [0 , q], also Vj must belong to the same interval; similarly, if V{ belongs to 
[1,1 +  q], also Vj does. This implies that the random variables Vi, Vj are affiliated.17
Two different settings are analyzed:
• case a) Bidder F is fully informed regarding both tp  and Q (full information).
15We use the tilde notation (e.g. U, Vi) to indicate random variables and the notation without the
tilde sign (e.g. U, Vi) to indicate a specific realization of the random variable.
16 Alternatively, one could think of U as the expected valuation of the players and of Q as the realization
of a common noise on the private signal.
17The reader can refer, for instance, to Milgrom and Weber (1982) for the notion of affiliation.
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• case b) Bidder F learns only the aggregate information, vf (partial information).
Notice that for S it makes no difference whether we assume that he observes the 
aggregate value vs or the realization of both signals: in either case he has a unique 
weakly dominant strategy to be active up to vs •
For both cases we are going to first conjecture that a pre-emptive equilibrium exists 
and then verify its existence . A pre-emptive equilibrium can exist only if two conditions 
hold.
• (Al): 0 < cs  < c*s .
•  (A2 ): vo > vfi > 0.
The first condition says that bidder S investment cost, though strictly positive cannot 
be too big. Intuitively, if the cost is very high, bidder S would never invest regardless of 
the initial bid observed. Hence, there would be no reason to jump bid.
The second condition ensures that vq is high enough so that the profits from allowing 
competition are strictly lower than the ones from pre-empting for at least some types of 
bidder F. To see this point, take the simplest case in which q = 0 and U ~  U[0,1] and 
assume that vq = 0. Note that if bidder S does not invest, he can still profitably stay 
active up to a price p = But then it is easy to check that all types of bidder F would 
rather prefer bidder S to discover his valuation rather than paying with probability one
» =  I  18 P T
The same restrictions are assumed in Fishman (1988). In particular, he assumes that 
c*s  equals bidder S expected profits conditional on the information t p > v o-19 As for Vq, 
he assumes that such value is given by bidder S expected value. We follow the same 
restrictions on Cg and Vq. Since in our model the initial bid conveys some information 
regarding bidder’s S valuation, we assume that Vq equals the expected value of the pri­
vate component plus the common element. Then, S if pre-empted from investing will 
not be able to profitably bid in the auction.
The difference in terms of equilibrium conditions and outcomes between the partial 
information case and the full information case emerges only when the pre-emptive bid
18With type tp  =  1 being indifferent between paying |  and competing with an informed bidder S.
19These are the expected profits in the equilibrium where signaling is not allowed. Note that the less
stringent condition that the value c*s  is the one that equals bidder S profits conditional on not observing 
a jump could be imposed. We comment further on this in section 5.
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does not reveal the state of the world with certainty. We postpone the discussion re­
garding the equilibrium in which a jump reveals a good state for later. For now it is 
sufficient to point out that the value of q needs to be not ’’too large”. In particular, 
the maximum value of q compatible with an equilibrium that leaves some uncertainty 
regarding the common value is different for the two informational settings. When we 
discuss the equilibrium for case a) and case b) the relevant restriction indicated below 
will be assumed to hold:
•  case a): q < q*.
• case b): q < q**, 
where q** > q*.
For both cases the following equilibrium structure holds. The initial bid of bidder F 
takes one of two values, either vq or some p >  v o. Only the latter one prevents the second 
bidder from investing and competing. All types of bidder F over a certain threshold place 
a pre-emptive bid, while all others accommodate competition by bidding vq. The notion 
of type, though, is not the same in the two settings. As a matter of fact, in case a) a 
type is identified by a one-dimensional signal (uj), while in case b) by a two-dimensional 
signal (U,Q). This implies that in case a) the equilibrium needs to specify a different 
threshold for each state, whereas only one threshold is necessary for case b).
Once the equilibrium is characterized, we will be interested in two different types 
of comparative statics. First, we compare our setting with Fishman’s one (q = 0) and 
evaluate the effect of increasing the relative size of the common component. Intuitively, 
a higher value of q could benefit bidder F under a good state as he may be able to pre­
empt bidder S even with a lower private type. However, it also becomes more difficult to 
pre-empt from a bad state. We want to evaluate from an ex-ante perspective how much 
of the possible increase in rent (due to the higher expected value for the object) bidder 
F is able to seize and how his profits (as well as the ones of the other players) vary.
Second, we compare the equilibrium in case a) with the one in case b), to understand 
whether more information advantages or harms bidder F.
2.2.2 T im ing
The timing of the game is as follows.
•  Stage I: F learns his valuation vp (either the sum of the signals or both compo-
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nents) and decides which initial bid, 6 1 , (if any) to place.20
• Stage II: S observes 61 and decides whether to learn his valuation, vs or not. If he 
decides to get the information he pays a cost, C5 .
• Stage III: If S has acquired information in stage II, a standard Japanese version of 
the ascending price auction unfolds.21
In equilibrium, F anticipates S decision in the second stage as the latter one is a 
binary choice that is taken holding no ex-ante private information. The game above can 
then be seen as a two stage game, where in the first stage the first bidder has the option 
to end the game immediately with a high offer or to play the Japanese version of the 
English auction.
We indicate the subgame where the equilibrium actions are given by the pair ’’pre­
emptive bid/no investment” by p (for pre-emptive game) and the subgame characterized 
by the actions ’’accommodate/ invest” by c (for competitive game).
Instead of looking at the Japanese auction (where the price is raised continuously), 
we could allow for jumps to occur at any time. However, assuming a standard Japanese 
auction is with little loss of generality as such subgame is reached only when both bid­
ders know exactly their valuation. In such case there is little scope for further signaling 
(or for hiding information as in Michelucci (2007a)) as, given the absence of bidding 
costs, both bidders have as a weakly dominant strategy to stay active till their value is 
reached. This avoids considering an enlarged type space.
It may be convenient to illustrate more precisely bidders payoff. Let ds € {0,1} 
represent S decision whether to compete or stay out. In particular, let ds = 1 indicate 
that S competes, while ds = 0 indicate that he does not. Given an initial bid b\ from F, 
we have that bidder F profits are:
20In equilibrium, a bid is observed provided that vf > vq.
21 See Milgrom and Weber (1982) for the formal description. In equilibrium, a bid by S will be placed 
only if vs > max(vo,&i).
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7rp (vf, vs, h ,  0) =  vp — b\
vp — b\ if vs < bi
pp {vp, vs, h ,  1 ) =   ^vp -  vs  if b\ < vs < vf
0  if vs > vp
while bidder S profits axe:
ns(vF,vs ,bi,0) =  0 
ns(vF,vs ,bi , l )  =  *
vs — vp — cs if vs > vf 
—cs if vs < vp
The following section analyses the equilibrium bidding behavior.
2.3 Equilibrium Behavior
We present below the equilibrium analysis both for case a) and case b). In terms of 
equilibrium actions and equilibrium outcomes the two cases differ only when the pre­
emptive bid is placed with positive probability from both states of the world. We refer 
to such equilibrium as pooling.
A different equilibrium arises when the pre-emptive bid can be placed only from the 
good state. We refer to it as fully revealing?2 All types of bidder F strictly prefer the 
pooling equilibrium as it guarantees pre-emption for a strictly larger set of types.23 This 
will imply that the fully revealing equilibrium can emerge as a ” credible” equilibrium 
outcome only when the pooling one is not available.24
For case a), the one-dimensional pre-emptive bid conveys information regarding a 
two-dimensional type. This means, as anticipated, that while in case b) the equilibrium 
can be characterized by a unique equilibrium threshold, call it r**, a pair of thresholds 
call them (r5,rj), is needed in case a ) . 25 As a matter of fact, even though bidder S can 
recover from r** that rj* =  r** and r** = r** — q, what is crucial in case b) is that the 
difference between those thresholds is equal to q, for any q. Such difference is not equal
22 We refer to it as fully revealing as the state is revealed with probability one, the private type however 
is not.
23 And in equilibrium all types that choose preemption over competition necessarily get higher expected
profits under preemption.
24We will be more precise about the meaning of ’’credible”, when we discuss uniqueness.
25We use Tq for the equilibrium threshold of bidder F when Q =  0, and r , when Q =  q.
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to q in case a), and we later show that is strictly greater. This will be one of the key 
point of difference between the two settings.
case a) : B idder F  knows b o th  tp  and  Q (full inform ation case)
The following proposition states more formally what already anticipated about the struc­
ture of the equilibrium. We assume that in the sub-game in which bidder S invests and 
finds out his value, he stays active till v s 26 Then, the equilibrium is fully characterized 
by bidder’s F initial bid, &i(tp, Q), by bidder’s S beliefs conditional on observing 6 1 , 
g(b{), and by his investment decision, ds(bi). We look at the Perfect Bayesian Equilib­
rium (PBE), hence the equilibrium triple (b*(tp, Q), d*(&i),g*(6 i)) needs to satisfy that: 
1 ) 6*(tp, Q) maximizes bidder F expected payoffs given 2 ) d*(&i) maximizes bid­
der S expected payoffs given g*{b\); 3) g*{bi) is consistent with Bayes rule given the 
equilibrium initial offer b*(tp, Q). The last part defines consistent beliefs.
P roposition  2.1. The triple (b*(tF,Q),dl(bi),g*(bi)) constitutes the unique perfect 
bayesian equilibrium with credible beliefs of the auction game described above, where:
p* if Q =  0 and tp > rj or Q = q and tp > r* 
vo otherwise
0  if 61 =  p*
1 otherwise
g* (bi) =  consistent and credible beliefs
K (tF,Q) = { 
d*s (bi) = <
It is easy to construct beliefs that are consistent.27 The restriction to credible beliefs 
guarantees uniqueness. Here we prove that a triple satisfying point 1) to 3) exists. We 
then argue in section 6  that the equilibrium we propose is the unique one with credible 
beliefs. The fact that there is a unique equilibrium with credible beliefs is already shown 
in a private value setting by Fishman (1988). No differences arise in our setting. We 
remand the reader to section 6  for a discussion.
We proceed by construction. First, we prove that the equilibrium pre-emptive bid 
has to be the same no matter what the state of the world is. Second, we state the 
conditions that identify the threshold values 7q and r* and show how these two values
26 This is his weakly dominant strategy.
27For instance, we could have S believe, after observing b\ =  p*, that with probability Pr(Q =  0|&i =  
P*), t f > T 0 and with probability Pr(Q =  q\bi =  p*), t f  > rq; while tF =  Vo, otherwise.
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are related. Finally, we make sure that it is not profitable for types of bidder F below 
the threshold value to pre-empt, thus guaranteeing that is a best reply for S to stay 
out, when a pre-emptive bid is observed. We remand the discussion regarding ” credible 
beliefs” and uniqueness to section 6 .
Lemma 2.1. The equilibrium pre-emptive bid must be unique independently of bidder 
F private type and of the state of the world, i. e. different types of bidder F pool on the 
same bid.
Proof. Assume, by means of contradiction, that two different pre-emptive bids exist and 
call them p and p .28 Without loss of generality take p > p .
Since by assumption both bids are pre-emptive, and given that the state of the world 
is not observable by bidder S , the lower bid, p , guarantees pre-emption at a lower cost. 
A deviation follows with any bidder F of a type that is supposed to bid p mimicking 
the type(s) that is (are) supposed to bid p , which yields the desired contradiction. 
Therefore, p = p =  p*.
□
In equilibrium bidder F chooses the pre-emptive bid that makes bidder S indifferent 
between investing and competing or staying out, that is he will push bidder S expected 
profits net of the investment cost to zero.29
In equilibrium, since bidder S knows that bidder F is aware of the state of the world, 
he can correctly infer that bidder F must be at least type ro (rq) if the state of the world 
observed is the bad (good) one. A higher bid signals both a higher ro and a higher rq, 
which holding the probability of the state of the world constant would unambiguously 
more strongly deter bidder S. However, bidder S also learns something regarding the 
common value, which as anticipated works against the interest of bidder F.
As a matter of fact, the probability of a bad state conditional on observing an initial 
bid p > v0 is Pr(Q = 0|&i =  p) = i ^ P r ( ; the probability of a good 
state is Pr(Q  =  q\b\ = p) = 1 — Pr(Q = 0|&i =  p).
Since ro > rq, we have that Pr(Q = 0|&i =  p) < that is placing an initial pre­
emptive bid makes the bad state less likely and thus the good state more likely (for 
which the private threshold signaled is lower).
28The same argument excludes that more than two different preemptive bids can be planed.
29There exist other equilibria that involve bidder S making strictly negative profits by investing. As
anticipated the one we focus is the unique one that is based on credible beliefs.
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Conversely, observing b\ =  i?o signals that the bad state is more likely as Pr(Q  =
°i61= ^ “ d r° > r q ■
Thus, differently from Fishman’s (1988) pre-emptive model, observing a jump bid 
conveys relevant information to the second bidder regarding his own valuation.
The expected (gross) profits for bidder S conditional on an initial bid, p, by bidder 
F and the bad state are E ( tts\Q =  0  and b\ =  p) =  E ( t s  — t p \ t p  G [?"o, 1 ] , t s  > tp ) -  
Similarly, his expected (gross) profits conditional on p and the good state are E ( i r s \ Q  — Q 
and bi = p) = E ( t s  -  G Vq, 1], ts  > *f)-
Recall that we denoted the subgame where S is pre-empted by p and the subgame 
where competition is allowed by c. The profits for bidder S from staying out are equal 
to zero and we denote them by 7r§ =  0. The profits from competing instead are denoted 
by 7Tg and depend on the pair (ro, rq) signaled by bidder F via b\. The equilibrium p 
(or equivalently, the equilibrium r) is the one that makes bidder S indifferent between 
competing or not, i.e. we want to look for a pair (ro,r9) such that 7r^(ro, rq) =  0 , where 
tccs are bidder S expected profits from investing and competing with F.
This leads us to the following condition to which we refer to as SIC (bidder S Indif­
ference Condition).
• (SIC): TTs(ro,rq) = ir^ = 0  iff Pr(Q = 0|&i =  p)*E(irs\Q  =  0  and &i =  p)+Pr(Q  =  
q\bx =  p) * E ( tts\Q =  q and b\ = p) = cs.
The above expression identifies the set of values of ro and rq that, given the infor­
mation cost, cs, make the second bidder indifferent whether investing for information or 
not entering the competition.
The indifference condition for bidder F then selects which pair from this set is the 
equilibrium one. If it turns out that no pair (ro, rq) such that ro < 1 can be selected it 
means that only the fully revealing equilibrium exists.
The price p needs to credibly signal a pair (ro, rq) as well as guarantee that is not 
profitable for lower types of bidder F to mimic higher types and place a pre-emptive bid. 
Since bidder F knows the state of the world we need to look at two different conditions.
The objective is to find an equilibrium initial bid p* such that, if the bad (good) 
state is realized, all types tp  > Vq (rq) prefer to bid p* and pre-empt the other bidder 
and all types tF < r $ (rj) prefer to bid vo and accommodate competition.
If Q = 0, we look for a type ro that solves the following equation:
• (FICB): 7r£(r0) =  r 0 -  p = P r(ts  < v0) * (r0 -  u0)+
Pr{ts  G (v0, r0]) * E ( t p  -  ts \tF = r0, ts  G (vo, r0]) =  7r£(r0)
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where the left hand side of the equality represents bidder F payoff if he decides to pre­
empt S and the right hand side the payoff if he decides to compete.
Similarly, if Q = q the indifference condition we look for is the following:
• (FICG): Kpirq) = rq + q - p  = [Pr(ts < v0 -  q) * (rq +  q -  u0)+
Pr{ts  e  (vo -  q, r J )  * E{tF -  ts \tF = rq, ts  G (vo -  q, rq]))\ = ncF(rq)
The equilibrium values, 7 g, r*, p*, stated in Proposition 1 are those that solve the 
system given by the equations (SIC), (FICB) and (FICG).
Recall that we are assuming that q < q*, so that a price that satisfies (FICB) and 
(FICG) and whose corresponding pair (ro, rq) induce bidder S to stay out exists. Call 
such price p . To see that (SIC) holds with equality assume by means of contradiction 
that at p \ < 0. Both ro and rq are an increasing and continuos function of p. Sim­
ilarly, 7Tg is continuos in ro and rq. Further, by assumption (Al) if p = vo, 7r£ > 0. 
Hence, there exits some p G (uo,p )  such that ir^ = 0.
One of the characterizing features of the equilibrium in case a) is that r^ — r* > q. 
To see why such inequality holds, assume first that p* induces a pair (rj,r*) such that 
r*0 = r*q +q.
Since in that case type r j  in the bad state and type r* in the good state hold the 
same value for the object, they also make the same profits by placing the pre-emptive 
bid. However, if bidder S invests, then bidder F with type r* in the good state has less 
chances to win than type r j  in the bad state (as once S gets to know the state only the 
realization of the private value component matters). Hence, if type rg in the bad state 
is indifferent between pre-empting and accommodating, type r* in the good state will 
strictly prefer pre-emption.
Since the left hand side of (FICG) grows faster in r* than the right hand side, any 
increase in r* from r^—q makes bidder F of type r* even more strongly prefer pre-emption 
over competition.
By the same argument decreasing r* monotonically decreases the initial imbalance, 
which proves that if an equilibrium pair ( r j ,r j )  exists, it must be that *o ~ r*q > q.
Another result that is easily derivable is an upper bound on q*, the maximum value 
of q compatible with a pooling equilibrium. We show that q* < 1 — r°, where r° is the 
equilibrium threshold when q = 0  so that 7g =  r* = r°.
We argue that at q*, 7g — r* =  1 — r°. The conclusion then follows from r^ — r* > q*. 
Note that the equilibrium price is the lowest that guarantees pre-emption. Since the
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price is increasing in q (see point i below), the highest q is the one that leaves =  1 as 
the only type to be able to jump under the bad state. In such case, bidder S is virtually
good state is r 0.30
The following lemma shows how the equilibrium parameters are affected by a relative 
increase of the the common value component, q.
Lem m a 2.2. The effect of a change in q on the equilibrium parameters is the following:
for the following point, we assume that U, i = F ,S  are taken from uniform distri­
butions. Then:
• v) The ex-ante probability of placing a jump is strictly decreasing in q.
Proof i) Suppose that p stays constant as q increases. Condition (FICB) is not affected 
so that Tq is unchanged. Instead, the left hand side of (FICG) becomes greater than the 
right hand side. To reestablish the equality r* needs to decrease. But then condition 
(SIC) does not hold anymore. To see that p cannot decrease observe that for any such 
price the pair (ro, rq) signaled with the original level of p was not enough to pre-empt 
S. The same argument as above excludes that it can be with new value of q.
ii) point i) shows that the price increases with q. Then the left hand side of (FICB) 
becomes smaller than the right hand side. Thus, r j  needs to increase to counteract such 
imbalance.
iii) To see that for low levels of q, rq decreases with q, take first q = 0. We then 
have that ro =  rq = r°, where r° is the level that guarantees pre-emption when <7 =  0. 
Increase then q marginally to some strictly positive value. We know from ii) that ro 
increases. If rq were to increase as well, the type signaled would be higher than the 
one that guarantees pre-emption (r°), regardless of what the probabilities of the realized 
state are. Hence, rq < r°, for any q, which than implies that around q = 0, rq must
30Note that r° is the threshold that needs to be signaled when there is no uncertainty regarding the 
state (q =  0).
sure that the state is good so that the threshold that needs to be signaled under the
a) 5 *  > o.
H i) ^ 0^  CLYid ^ 1? /or q  ^ 0 Q/tbd small G’TtouQh*
iv) -]%)- > 0 and > 1, for q > 0 and arbitrarily close to q:
CHAPTER 2. INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND PRE-EMPTIVE BIDDING 26
decrease. The second part is implied by the first one. Suppose in fact that p were to 
increase by more than q. Then the left hand side of FICG would decrease as opposed to 
a constant right hand side. Hence, rq would rather increase to reestablish the equality.
iv) This point follows from the fact that for any q E (0, q*), r* < r° (see point iii) 
and that at q*, r* = r°. The second part is implied by the first one. Suppose in fact 
that p were to increase by less than q. Then the left hand side of FICG would increase 
as opposed to a constant right hand side. Hence, rq would rather decrease to reestablish 
the equality.
v) Note that the ex-ante probability of observing a jump is given by \  * (1 — 7g) +  
 ^* (1 — r*). From point ii) we know that r j  is increasing in q. Thus we only need to 
exclude that the increase in r j  could be less than the potential decrease in r*. Suppose 
they were the same (the same argument applies otherwise). Then, given the uniform 
distribution, the expected increase in profits for bidder S conditional on the good state 
would be equal to the expected decrease in profits conditional on the bad state. Since 
under the jump the good state is more likely, it means that such change in 7q and r* is 
not enough to guarantee pre-emption (the effect on the original probabilities is second 
order and can be neglected).
□
Point iv) implies the following perhaps slight surprising corollary:
C orollary  2 .1 . A marginal increase in q may result in lower expected profits for bidder 
F even conditional on observing a good state.
Proof. It follows from r* being increasing in q, for some q E (0, q*). All bidders that were 
not able to pre-empt with the lower level of q are not able to do so with the higher level 
so that for them the profits are unchanged. However, all types higher than the initial 
threshold that guarantees pre-emption make strictly higher profits before the increase 
in q. In fact, the initial threshold type is just indifferent but all higher types enjoy the 
full rent over the difference between their value and the threshold one, whereas they do 
not under the equilibrium holding with the higher value of q.
□
Point v) of the lemma above implies the following proposition.
P roposition  2.2. The bidders and seller’s profits vary with the size of the common 
value component as follows:
• The ex-ante expected profits for bidder F are decreasing in q.
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• The ex-ante expected profits for bidder S are independent of q.
• The seller’s expected revenues are increasing in q.
Proof The first point follows directly if the higher level of q induces both a higher ro and 
a higher rq (as the set where F can pre-empt is strictly larger and pre-emption guarantees 
more profits than competition). If instead rq decreases with q, it follows from point v) 
and the assumption of uniform distributions (the gains (losses) from having a larger 
(lower) set of bidders pre-empting rather than allowing competition is just proportional 
to set of bidder of bidders who can pre-empt).
To see the second point note that by construction an equilibrium jump leaves bidder 
S indifferent between entering the auction game or not. Thus, for any q we may look at, 
his profits are the same whether he follows the equilibrium or he always invests regardless 
of bidder’s F action. But if he always invests the expected profits are independent of q.
Finally, the seller’s revenues increase as the object in the sub-game analyzed is always 
sold (vf > vo) and the total surplus that is generated from the auction increases with 
q (as the expected value for the object is higher). Hence, if bidder’s F profits decrease 
and bidder’s S profits are constant, the seller’s revenues must increase.
□
Note that the points made above depend crucially on having an exogenous investment 
cost. We go back to this point later.
case b) : Bidder F knows v f  (partial information case)
This is the scenario where bidder F observes only his value, vp , but does not know 
whether the state is good or bad.
To be more precise, given the discreteness of the common value component, a bidder 
F observing a value vp € [0, q] or v f  G [1,1 +  q\ is able to infer the state. However, any 
bidder for which vp G [<?, 1] cannot make such inference.
Note that, even though bidder F is not aware of the state, he can use Bayes rule to 
update his beliefs regarding it, by observing v f  G [q, 1]. In general, bidder F retains finer 
information than bidder S. We want to compare the full information case with the one 
in which bidder F and bidder S are equally uninformed regarding the state of nature. 
For case b), we then assume from the beginning that tp  ~  U[0,1], which guarantees that 
Pr(Q  =  0 |vf =  vp) =  Pr(Q = 0) =  5 , for any vp G [q, 1], as desired.
We again prove the equilibrium by construction by first conjecturing that a pre­
emptive equilibrium exists and that all types of bidder F above some threshold do make
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use of the pre-empive bid, and then showing that this is actually the case. The analysis 
is largely analogous to case a), we only focus on the differences.
Define the threshold valuation signaled by bidder F by r so that all types vp > r do 
jump and all types vp < r do not.
Since bidder S knows that bidder’s F threshold type r  is unaware of the state of 
nature, what he infers from the initial bid is that if the state turns out to be bad, bidder 
F private value component must be at least ro =  r, while if the state is good, bidder F 
private component must be at least rq = r — q.
In equilibrium the pair (ro, rq) will be the one that makes bidder S just indifferent 
whether to invest and compete or stay out of the game.
Bidder S Indifference Condition for case b) is analogous to the one of case a), except 
for the fact that ro =  rq +  q.
•  (SIC2 ): 7Tg(r) =  7r§ =  0 iff Pr(Q  =  0|&i = p) * E(irs\Q = 0 and b\ = p) +  Pr(Q  =  
# i  =  p) * E(tts\Q = q and b \= p ) = cs ,
where the expressions above are defined as in (SIC), except that ro =  rq +  q
Such pair may not be unique as a higher initial bid not only signals a higher ro and 
rq but also shifts probabilities from the bad to the good state, under which we have that 
threshold type is rq = r — q < r = rq. If there are multiple solutions the equilibrium 
is given by the one with a lower level of r  as it is guarantees higher profits to bidder 
F for all of his possible types.31 If the minimum r  that solves such equation is strictly 
greater than one, no pooling equilibrium exists and the next section on the fully revealing 
equilibrium applies.
For the signal to be credible bidder F with type r  needs to be indifferent between 
pre-empting S or compete with all stronger types strictly preferring pre-emption and all 
lower types strictly preferring competition.
As opposed to case a), only one indifference condition for bidder F needs to be 
verified.
The condition we look for, to which we refer to as FIC2, is the following.
• (FIC2 ): 7r£(r) =  r  -  p = \  * [Pr(ts < vo) * (r -  u0)+
P r(ts e {v0, r]) * E{tF -  is \ip = r ,ts  e  (v0, r]))] +  \  * [Pr(ts  < v 0 -q )*
31 There typically exists many equilibria, but the one with lowest r is the only credible one, we postpone 
the discussion regarding uniqueness for later.
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(r -  v0) +  P r(is  e ( v 0 - q , r -  q]) * E (tF - t s \tF = r -  q, ts e ( v 0 - q , r -  ?]))] =  
i  * nFo(r) +  \  * 7rcFq(r) = ttcF(r),
where FcFq and 7r ^  are respectively bidder F profits from allowing competition if 
the state turns out be bad and if turns out to be good.
Condition (SIC2) determines the minimum threshold level that we define as r** that 
is high enough to deter bidder S from investing and competing. Given such threshold we 
can compute the expected profit of a bidder F with such type, irF(r**). Since (r**) = 
r** — p, where r** > ttF(r**) > 0 , there exists a unique value of p, which we define as 
p** _  r** _  ^ (r* * ), that makes the threshold type, r**, indifferent between placing the 
pre-emptive bid or accommodating competition.
It is also immediate to see, differentiating with respect to r the left and the right 
hand side of condition (FIC2), that ttF(r) grows faster than ttF{r). Thus, the two values 
cross only once at p* * .32 We can conclude that p** is the equilibrium pre-emptive price, 
that all types vF < r** prefer to compete, while all types vF > r** prefer to pre-empt 
bidding p**.
Proposition 2.3. The triple (b**(vF),dl*(bi),g**(bi)) constitutes the unique perfect 
bayesian equilibrium with credible beliefs of the game described above:
p** if vF > r**
i f H  =  < vo otherwise 
I 0 if &i =  p** 
d r (6 l)  "  (  1 otherwise 
g* (bi) =  consistent and credible beliefs
As for case a), we can establish a bound on q. We show that q** > 1 — r°. Suppose 
that q** < 1 — r°, and take rj* =  1 and r** =  1 — q**. We then have that both r** and rj* 
are greater than r°, which means that the pair signaled makes the second bidder strictly 
prefer staying out. Decreasing marginally r** would increase q, while still preserving 
pre-emption. Thus the proposed q** cannot be the maximum q that guarantees the 
existence of a pooling equilibrium.
The following lemma shows how rj* and r** are affected by an increase in q.
32 As a matter of fact, any tF > r** is able to appropriate all of ~P** under preemption, while part 
of such rent is inevitably dissipated by allowing competition.
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Lem m a 2.3. The effect of a change in q on the equilibrium parameters is the following:
for the following point, we assume that U, i = F ,S  are taken from uniform distri­
butions. Then:
• iv) The ex-ante probability of placing a jump is strictly decreasing in q.
Proof, i) Take some equilibrium pair, (rj*, r**), where rj* =  r**. We show that r** needs 
to increase to keep (SIC) satisfied. If it were to stay constant, 7q* would be constant 
and r** =  r j  — q would decrease making the good state more likely and the threshold 
signaled in such event lower, thus signaling a pair of types {ro,rq) not high enough to 
pre-empt S. Since the starting r** was the lowest r to guarantee pre-emption with the 
original value of q, if we apply the same argument to a lower level of r it is easy to see 
that the new equilibrium r cannot be lower than the initial one.
ii) See point iii) of lemma 2.
iii) We know from point i) that starting from an equilibrium r and increasing q, r 
increases. This, as already observed, increases the left hand side of equation SIC by 
more than the right hand side. Hence, p needs to increase to reestablish the indifference.
iv) See point v) of lemma 2 .
The same qualitative results as for case a), i.e. proposition 2, follow for case b) and 
they are not reproduced here.
2.3.1 Fully revealing equilibrium
Before stating the equilibrium conditions for the fully revealing equilibrium we introduce 
the following lemma.
Lem m a 2.4. The value of q for which the fully revealing equilibrium arises is lower in 
case a) than in case b), i.e. q** > q*.
Proof. Take q* as the maximum value of q for which a pooling equilibrium exists for 
case a). We know that the equilibrium thresholds associated with that value of q are 
such that r j  — r* > q*. If the pair ( r j ,r j)  was pre-emptive in case a), it must also be
= 0-
• ii) ~W  < 0 , for q > 0  and small enough.
□
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in case b (if SIC is satisfied also SIC2  is). To see that also FIC2 is satisfied simply take 
p** = r** — 7rp(r**), for r** = r j . Hence, we have that q** > r j  — rq > q*, as desired.
□
In the previous section we have illustrated the effect of an increase of q both on 
the probability of observing a jump and on the players’ profits when the value of q was 
within the range for which the pooling equilibrium is feasible. A natural question that 
arises is what happens as the type of equilibrium switches to a fully revealing one. This 
is addressed in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.5. In general, in case b), a marginal increase in q that switches the equilibrium 
from a pooling to a fully revealing one causes a discontinuous change both in the ex-ante 
probability of observing a jump, in the pre-emptive price and in the players’ profits. Such 
a discontinuity is not observed in case a).
Proof. For case b), unless we are in the non generic case for which q** = 1 — r°, we have 
that q** > 1—r°, which means that the threshold 7g* associated with q** must be strictly 
less than one. To see why note that when rj* =  1, the only possible values of rq that 
guarantee prc_emption are greater or equal than r , but m that case 1 rq q**. We 
then have that the valuation signaled in a neighborhood of q** changes from r** =  7q < 1 
in the pooling equilibrium to r° +  q** > 1 in the fully revealing one. Since all the other 
variables we are interested in (price, profits, ex-ante probability of winning) are continuos 
functions of r**, such marginal change in q also discontinuously affects those variables.
For case a), instead we already noticed that at q*, r j  =  1 and r* = r° so that no 
discontinuity arises.
□
The fully revealing equilibrium differs from the pooling one as the threshold value 
signaled is such that vp > 1. We denote the the corresponding private type signaled by 
rq. Note that it must be that rq = r° as in both cases the state is perfectly known.
The value rq is the level of r  solves the following condition.
• (SIC3): 7Tg(r) =  7Tg =  0, iff E (ts  — tp\tp  G [r, l] ,fs  > tp) = cs
As for the pooling equilibrium, for such threshold to be credible bidder F holding 
such type needs to be effectively indifferent among pre-empting or competing with all 
higher (lower) types strictly preferring pre-emption (competing). The condition we look 
for is the following.
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• (FIC3): 7rpF{r) = r + q - p =  [Pr(ts <vo -  q) * (r -  v0)+
P r(ts e ( v o - q , r -  q]) * E (tF - t s \tF = r -  q, ts e { v 0 - q , r -  g]))] =  7r£(r)
The same arguments used for the pooling equilibrium ensure that an equilibrium r 
and equilibrium p exists. Call the equilibrium p in the fully revealing case pq.
We can then state the following.
P roposition  2.4. The triple constitutes the unique per­
fect bayesian equilibrium with credible beliefs of the auction game described above:
pq if Q =  q and tp > rq
b*r (tF,Q) = {  ,
vq otherwise
0  if b\ = p9
1 otherwise
g** (bi) =  consistent and credible beliefs
We also have the following lemma.
Lem m a 2.6. The effect of a change of q on the equilibrium parameters is the following:
• * ) %  = 1 -
Proof The first point follows from the fact that (SIC3) is independent of q. Given 
such fact, everything else but q and p is fixed in (FIC3). Hence, to keep the equilibrium 
indifference condition holding, all the increase in q must be fully absorbed by an increase 
in the price.
□
A corollary result is the following.
Corollary 2.2. The bidders and sellers9 profits vary with the size of the common value 
component as follows:
The ex-ante expected profits of bidder F are independent of q. 
The ex-ante expected profits of bidder S are independent of q. 
The sellers expected revenues are increasing in q.
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Proof. Bidder’s F ex-ante expected profits depend only on rq. Since rq is independent of 
q, so are the profits. Bidder’s S ex-ante profits axe independent of q for the same reason 
as in the pooling equilibrium. All the increase in the object value given by the increase 
in q is then fully appropriated by the seller. Hence, the third point.
□
2.4 More vs. less information (case a vs. case b)
The following lemma illustrates how the pair (r$ ,r*), (r£*, r**) are related. It will be 
key in assessing the comparative statics analysis that follows.
Lemma 2.7. The threshold pairs (r^, r*), (r^*, r**) are related as follows.
• i ) r *0  > r*0*
• ii) for any q < q*, such that (r^, r*) are the equilibrium thresholds signaled in 
case a), there exists a level of q, q < q**, such that (r^*, r**) are the equilibrium 
thresholds signaled in case b) and r™ =  rg, r** = r*, Tq* — r** =  q .
Proof, i) Suppose rj$ < r^*. Either r* > r** or r* < r**. The first case cannot hold true 
as it implies r j  — r* < q.
To see why the second cannot hold either, note that by assumption the pair (r$,r*) 
pre-empts bidder S from competing in case a) and that * 0  -  r*q > q. But then take 
r0  = r j  and rq = r j  — q. If the pair (r^, r*) was pre-emptive, the pair (r^, r'q) must also 
be as it differs only because of rq > rq, which makes the pair even ’’more pre-empting” 
as a higher value of rq both shifts the probabilities towards the bad state and makes 
competition tougher in the good state. Hence, by continuity there exists a pair (rQ,rq), 
with 7*0 < 7q* and such that pre-emtion is still ensured, which contradicts that (r^*, r**) 
is the lowest pair inducing pre-emption for case b).
ii) Note first that for any given value of ro there exists at most one value of rq for 
which (SIC) and (SIC2) are satisfied. This is so as we have seen that a lower level of rq 
strictly increases bidder S ex-ante expected profits and vice versa a higher level strictly 
decreases them. Moreover, both Tq and r^* are a continuos increasing function of q. So 
any particular value of ro greater than r° and lower than the maximum value compatible 
with a pooling equilibrium forms an equilibrium pair (ro, rq) for some value q for case 
a) and for some q < q for case b).
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Point ii) of the above lemma leads us to the following proposition.
P roposition  2.5. I f  bidders private value are taken from uniform distributions, then 
case a) and case b) can be unambiguously ranked as follows. For any given q < q**, the 
ex-ante probability of observing a jump and the ex ante expected profits of bidder F are 
higher in case b) than case a). The ex-ante expected profits for bidder S are invariant; 
finally, the seller’s profits are higher in case a).
Proof. Note that once we know that a pair (ro, rq) is an equilibrium one, we can recover 
from that all other variables we are interested in. Point ii) above tells us that the 
threshold pair and hence all other variables of interest for case b), for some value q , are 
the same as the one for case a), for some q < q . The conclusion then follows because 
all relevant variables at q and q can be unambiguously ranked as shown in Proposition 
2. □
2.5 Jump Bidding and Information Acquisition
In this section we discuss the effect of jump bidding on the incentive to acquire infor­
mation and in turn on the format’s revenues and efficiency.
It is interesting to analyze the incentives to acquire information both for the first 
bidder and the second bidder. Here we assume that both need to invest to find out their 
values. As before, the first bidder can do so before the second bidder (call his investment 
cost cp). Fishman (1988) argues that the possibility of jump bidding should be banned 
as it reduces the seller’s revenues. He also points out that efficiency is not affected. Such 
conclusions are based on the implicit assumption that the investment cost is low enough 
so that both bidders invest when jump bidding is not allowed.
However, not only the first bidder expected profits are higher under the jump bidding 
equilibrium, but also and the second bidder’s profits conditional on not observing a jump 
are. This means that the investment cost may be low enough to allow the first bidder 
to participate in the auction if jump bidding is allowed, but not if it is forbidden (and 
similarly for the second bidder). Hence, the finer information that is brought to the 
second bidder in the jump bidding equilibrium can potentially increase efficiency and 
revenues. We first focus on efficiency.
2.5.1 Efficiency
We distinguish two cases: the one in which the investment cost is low enough so that 
a bidder would invest also if jump bidding is forbidden, and the one in which if jump
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bidding is not allowed the bidder does not invest.
Let us start with the first case and look at how bidder’s S participation decision 
affects efficiency.
We argue that efficiency is not affected in the first case. To see why note that bidder’s 
S expected profits if he competes coincide with the expected gain in social surplus (given 
by the increase in value of always allocating to the highest valuation bidder). Further, 
the jump bid is constructed as to equate bidder’s S investment cost to his expected 
profits from investing and competing. Hence, the social costs of misallocating the object 
is cancelled out by the social gain of avoiding a sunk cost (bidder’s S investment cost).
Let us then move to the second case. It is easy to see that the jump bidding equilib­
rium increases efficiency as under no jump bidding bidder S is always out of the game, 
while with jump bidding he enters when it is strictly profitable for him to do so (and we 
noted that his private interest coincides with the social one).
A similar analysis holds true for bidder F. The same arguments used above shows 
that jump bidding does not affect efficiency if the investment cost is in the range implied 
by the first case. As for the second case, if the first bidder does not participate there is 
a clear loss in efficiency. Note that to be precise on the consequences of bidder F non 
participation, we need to specify whether bidder F is then out of the game or he can 
participate after the other bidder has potentially invested and placed a first bid. We 
might have scenarios in which none of the bidders is willing to invest first as the expected 
profits are too low, which would leave the object unsold.
We have shown that for some ranges of bidder’s S profits efficiency is unchanged, 
while for others strictly increases. We can conclude that jump bidding, if anything, is 
beneficial as far as efficiency is concerned.
2.5 .2  R evenues
The effect of jump bidding on revenues depends on the value of the investment cost we 
look at. As a matter of fact, in those scenarios where efficiency is increased also revenues 
are (the participation of an additional bidder clearly raises revenues). However, when 
the bidders’ investment costs are low enough that they both invest when jump bids are 
prohibited, the seller’s revenues are strictly lower under jump bididing. This point is 
already pointed out in Fishman (1988).
To see why first note that no difference arises if the first bidder is below the equilib­
rium threshold as in both cases the second bidder invests and competes. The equilibrium 
threshold type is indifferent between pre-empting or not. Under the first case he wins
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with probability one, under the second with probability less than one. This means that 
the equilibrium jump bid is such that the expected foregone profits of winning at an 
average price lower than the pre-emptive one, it is equal to the expected gain of winning 
at the pre-empt price instead of loosing when the second bidder has a higher valuation. 
Note that the expected gains (losses) for the threshold type of the first bidder are ex­
pected losses (gains) in terms of revenues for the seller. Hence, if the seller were to 
know that the first bidder type is the threshold one, his expected revenues would be the 
same with or without jump bidding. However, for all higher types of bidder F, the seller 
experiences a decrease in revenues.
Finally, notice that in the analysis above we have not considered the effect of a lower 
or higher common value component. However, it can simply be recovered from the 
analysis made earlier. The higher q, the lower the ex-ante expected profits for bidder 
F and the less the scenarios (values of cp) for which there may be an improvement in 
efficiency and revenues. Conversely, a higher value of q does not affect the expected 
profits of bidder S conditional on not observing a jump and so there is no change in 
efficiency due to that aspect.
2.6 Remarks on the model
We discuss in this section some of the modeling assumptions made in the paper and 
address related issues. We start discussing the uniqueness of our equilibrium.
2.6.1 U niqueness
We stated that the equilibrium provided is the unique one compatible with credible 
beliefs. We remand to Fishman (1988) for the formal details and we provide instead a 
more informal discussion here. The formal argument is based on an adaptation of the 
equilibrium refinement proposed in Grossman and Perry (1986).
It is easy to see that there are many other potential equilibrium candidates. In fact, 
they are all Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, but they are based on non credible beliefs. They 
resemble the one we presented in the sense that they share the same structure. However, 
they all involve a higher equilibrium pre-emptive price. Recall, in fact, that we took the 
minimum price that enabled to equate bidder’s S expected profits to his investment cost. 
So for any such p, we have that p > p*. This higher price needs to be chosen so that 
the pair of (ro, rq) signaled makes bidder S willing to stay out. Assuming that we are
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in case a), this means that ro > r£ and rq > r*. Choosing bidder’s S out of equilibrium 
beliefs so that bidder S is induced to compete against any lower initial bid, any such 
equilibrium can be easily constructed.33
Those equilibria are not credible in that they do not pass the following credibility 
check that restricts bidder’s S out of equilibrium beliefs. Suppose that instead of observ­
ing p, S observes a lower bid, for instance, our p*. Then he should ask himself, which 
types of bidder F could have possibly preferred to pre-empt at p*, rather than allowing 
competition. We know by our construction that optimal response for bidder S, had he 
made such introspection, it is to stay out. But then bidder F would rather bid p* then p. 
It is easy to see that p* is the unique price that is compatible with such type of beliefs.
2.6.2 C hoice o f value fu nction
We have assumed a mix of a private and a common component adopting an additive 
separable specification for the bidders’ value functions. The common value component 
has been chosen to take a point-wise distribution with a low and high realization being 
equally likely. The fact that the two values are assumed equally likely does not affect the 
analysis. A higher rather than a lower probability of a good state would simply increase 
the bid that is needed to pre-empt S, but would not change the qualitative features of 
the equilibrium.
The assumption that the common value can only take two values is also with little 
loss of generality. The one thing that would change were we to assume a continuous dis­
tribution, it is that the fully revealing equilibrium would disappear. However, increasing 
the maximum value that the common value component can take (i.e. enlarging its sup­
port) has an analogous effect to an increase in the value of q in the model presented. To 
have an intuition for this, note that the continuos distribution can be taken as the limit 
of a discrete one with an arbitrarily large number of states. Adding an extra state to 
our model requires considering an extra threshold private value type, but does not affect 
the workings of our equilibrium.
2.6.3 N o  ex-ante inform ation
The fact that bidder S holds no private information is made to simplify the analysis. 
We wanted to study the effect of jump bidding when a bidder had a better informa­
tion regarding a common value component in the simplest possible setting. The main
33 The same would hold in case b).
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insights would go through allowing for some initial private information. Adding private 
information would give rise to some partial pre-emption as illustrated in a pure private 
value model by Bhattacharyya (1992).
An additional complication would instead arise having the first bidder invest holding 
already some private information. In such a case, if the acquisition of information 
acquisition is observable, the act of investing can signal something about the private 
value of bidder F and therefore limit the need for jump bidding. Vice versa, if the 
information is covered (not observable), jump bidding may serve also to signal that the 
initial private value was high.
2.6 .4  n > 2 bidders
Another direction in which the model could be extended is to have the better informed 
bidder having an informational advantage with respect to a set of n — 1 symmetric 
bidders rather than just one. In this case the informed bidder needs to signal a high 
enough value such that the expected profits for any of his opponents conditional on 
having a value higher than the informed bidder and the other n- 2  initially symmetric 
bidders just equals the investment cost. Note that having n > 2 bidders also allows to 
weaken assumption (Al). That assumption was made to ensure that accommodating 
would not result to be always preferred to pre-empting. Having more bidders decreases 
the expected profits of accommodating, and therefore decreases the value of vq required.
2.6.5 U n certa in ty  over c s
In this paper we have assumed that the investment cost of the second bidder, cs was 
common knowledge. We then have discussed how efficiency and revenues could differ 
(whether or not allowing for jumps) if different value of cs were considered (section 
5). What if bidder’s F  only knows the underlying distribution of cs but not its exact 
realization? The effect of bidder’s S holding private information over his investment cost 
on bidder’s F bidding is similar to the one of him holding private information over his 
valuation. If the investment cost is bounded away from zero there will still be a fraction 
of bidder’s F type that will place a fully pre-emptive bid. However, intermediate types of 
bidder F will pre-empt bidder S only if the investment cost that this latter one observes 
is above some threshold. Those intermediate types do not pool on the same initial bid, 
rather they use a strictly increasing bid function. The uncertainty over cs , weakens the 
incentive to jump bid. To see why note that the threshold type that is able to jump
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bid needs to increase compared to the case we studied. The reason is that here, by 
jumping, he fully reveals his value, while when there is no uncertainty with respect of 
cs, he can pool with higher types. Another important consequence is that bidder’s S 
expected profits are no longer independent of C5 . This is likely to affect our analysis 
regarding the format’ s revenues and efficiency properties. A careful analysis of this is 
left for future research.
Chapter 3
Hiding information in open  
auctions
3.1 Introduction
Open auction formats allow bidders to observe one another’s bidding behavior in the 
course of the auction. Thanks to this dynamic feature bidders can learn extra pieces of 
information compared to sealed formats and can update their expected valuations for 
the object on sale accordingly.
The possibility of aggregating extra information affects bidders’ strategic behavior 
and ultimately the efficiency and revenue generating properties of a format.
The standard literature either implicitly or explicitly assumes that bidders cannot 
alter the aggregation of information or analyzes settings where it is simply not profitable.
In particular, it is often assumed that the price is continuously raised by some ex­
ogenous device that only allows to stay active or to drop-out but not to call a price. 
Such format is known in the literature as Japanese (or clock) auction. This assumption 
greatly simplify the analysis as it restricts a bidder’s options to the fairly simple choice 
of deciding whether to stay active or to quit at any given price. However, the dynamic 
aspect of the open format is no longer fully captured.
If we look at practical application, we can verify that in the vast majority of open 
formats the price is not raised in a continuous fashion, but rather discontinuously either 
by the auctioneer or through price calls made by the bidders.
The present paper covers the second possibility by looking at a modification of the 
Japanese auction that allows to call a price. When a bidder stops the clock to call a price, 
we say that such bidder has placed a jump bid. The possibility of calling a price provides
40
CHAPTER 3. HIDING INFORMATION IN  OPEN AUCTIONS 41
bidders with an instrument to affect the quality of the information that is transmitted 
during the auction. In fact, if some bidder does not match a price call, only the coarser 
information that his drop-out value is within some price interval will be available. In an 
interdependent value setting the precision of the information regarding the opponents’ 
exit values influences the expected valuations of the active bidders and therefore their 
exit decisions.
Since open auctions are very commonly used and they often allow to raise the price 
discontinuously, it is of great economic importance to understand how such possibility 
can be used in a strategic way.
Moreover, the analysis of open auctions is often relevant beyond those mechanisms 
that can be formally described as auctions. An example that is often given in the 
literature is the one of takeover battles, but most economic environments in which agents 
compete in price do also fit.
One of the typical situations we would like to represent is the following. Suppose that 
a novice bidder is competing with a set of more experienced bidders. To fix ideas on a 
simple economic problem, imagine that the novice bidder is competing for the allocation 
of a second hand car and that the other buyers are car dealers.
The novice bidder really likes the car while the car dealers care only about the resale 
price and have heterogeneous estimates regarding this latter value.
His valuation is not the highest, however, if some repairs are needed as those are 
more costly to him. The key assumption is that the active presence of many car dealers 
at high prices signals to the novice bidder that the car is in good condition and allows 
him to infer that he is the buyer with the highest valuation. Here is where the possibility 
of calling a price can be exploited. One of the expert bidders that has a high valuation 
for the car may place a fairly high bid at an initial stage to hide the drop-out values 
of other expert bidders. The idea is that the jump pre-empts the novice bidder from 
acquiring finer information and leaves him uncertain about the real quality of the car, 
thus affecting his bidding strategy. We formalize this intuition and show when it is 
actually profitable in equilibrium to place a jump and why.
We also show that allowing bidders to call a price does not always have an anticom­
petitive effect as the above scenario might suggest. As a matter of fact, the possibility 
of calling a price makes the strategic environment so rich that the effect not only on 
revenues but also on efficiency is in general ambiguous. We highlight some details of the 
environment that may lead to a certain outcome rather than another.
There are two main related strand of the literature to this paper. On the one hand,
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there are many papers pointing out the advantages and disadvantages of using an open 
ascending price auction rather then a sealed format. Our paper stresses that the possibil­
ity of calling a price is a crucial factor determining the performance of an open auction. 
Therefore when deciding which format to opt for, such a possibility should be carefully 
evaluated.
On the other hand, ours is not the first work that allows bidders to call a price and 
place jump bids. Yet, the previous models in the small literature on jump bidding provide 
a rational for such phenomena based on signaling rather than ’’hiding” information. 1
A priori it is not clear whether the fact that bidders receive extra information during 
the auction should be beneficial for the seller’s revenues or for the format efficiency.
The first strand of literature clarifies the effect of receiving finer information on 
revenues and efficiency in some subclasses of auction games.
Milgrom and Weber (1982) symmetric setting with affiliated valuations revenue ranks 
English Auction (EA), Second Price Auction (SPA) and First Price Auction (FPA) in this 
order.2 As soon as some asymmetries are introduced however the comparison becomes 
ambiguous.
From a social welfare viewpoint, it has been shown ( Krishna (2003), Birulin and 
Izmalkov (2003)) that if some technical single crosssing conditions are satisfied full effi­
ciency is achievable by means of a standard Japanese auction.3 When those conditions 
do not hold though the Japanese auction is in general not efficient.4
A strategic issue that is relevant in some applications5 is that in an open format 
a bidder can invest in order to get a finer estimate about his valuation as the auction 
unfolds, while in a sealed bid format such decision needs to be taken once and for all at the 
start. Compte and Jehiel (2007) show, in a private value setting, that an open format by 
endowing bidders with more information regarding the strength of competition induces 
more information acquisition that in turn, under general circumstances, translates into 
higher revenues and efficiency.
1See also an independent work by Ettinger (2006).
2Milgrom and Weber (1982) consider the Japanese version of the English Auction, where jumps are 
not allowed.
3Maskin (1992) provides the result for the n =  2 case. There though the Japanese auction is strate­
gically equivalent to the sealed bid SPA so that the distinction between open and sealed format as far
as information aggregation is concerned is not as crucial as for n > 2.
4See Hernando-Veciana and Michelucci (2007) regarding when the Japanese auction is second best
efficient.
5In particular, auctions or competitive situations that last sufficiently long. An example of this kind 
that is often referred to in the literature is the one of takeover contests.
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Allowing bidders to observe each others’ behavior has also drawbacks. It is generally 
argued, for instance, that open formats are more subject to collusion as a colluding cartel 
can easily observe when one of its members breaks the agreement and consequently can 
punish such deviator.
Furthermore, open formats leave a weak bidder with little chance to win. If there 
are participation costs this leads to low entry to the auction, which in turn suppresses 
revenues.
The second line of research that is related to ours is the one which considers models 
that allow for jump bids.
Two main rationalizations of jump bidding have been advocated. Both are based on 
a signaling motivation.
The first one was suggested by Fishman (1988).6 He presents a two-bidder indepen­
dent private value model in which one of the two bidders has an informational advantage 
in that he is able to costly discover his valuation prior to the start of the auction, while 
the other bidder does not. If the first bidder’s value is above some critical threshold, 
a jump bid that pre-empts the second bidder from investing and competing is placed.7 
The effect of a jump in this setting is anticompetitive and reduces the seller’s revenue. 
Essentially this model introduces an entry deterrence scenario, which requires costly 
information acquisition to work. This intuition fits very nicely some applications. How­
ever, it does not provide a general theory of jump bidding.
The other justification has been proposed by Avery (1998). He shows in a symmetric 
model with affiliated valuations that jump bidding can be employed by bidders to select 
during a first stage who among them is the strongest bidder.8 The signaling induces 
asymmetric bidding behavior in the second stage of the game with a strong bidder 
committing to a more aggressive strategy than a weak bidder. Such equilibrium behavior 
can be viewed as the author points out as a form of implicit collusion.
The model however cannot predict which of the many signaling equilibria that can 
constructed should be the one that is most ’’reasonably” played. Further, even admitting 
that the bidders can somehow coordinate on using the same system of messages, it is not 
clear to us what provides the credible commitment device to the asymmetric strategies 
in the unfolding of the game.
6 See also for related works Hirshleifer and Png (1989) and Bhattacharyya (1992) and Bernhardt and 
Scoones (1993).
rThis model is in private values. For a model that looks at the incentive to jump when the finer
information involves a common value element see Michelucci (2007b).
8See for instance Milgrom and Weber (1982) for the concept of affiliation.
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We find the signaling explanation more convincing in a multi-object auction as there 
bidders could coordinate on which object to focus their collusively efforts in order to 
split the ”pie of profits” . The adoption of signals conveying information of the type ”if 
you do not bother me on this object, I will not bother you on the one you are interested 
in” could potentially provide a robust collusive device.
Conversely, in a one object setting a bidder is ultimately going to take the whole pie. 
Why should he be given the chance of enjoying higher profits?
In an affiliated value setting the information provided by a jump induces bidders 
to revise their expected valuation upwards. Why should bidders revise their exit val­
ues downwards? As a matter of fact, Proposition 5.4 in Avery (1998) states that the 
equilibrium is not robust to perturbations9 of the second stage of the game. 10
The explanation we propose does not suffer from the issues raised above as it is based 
on a different rational. 11
In an open auction when valuation are interdependent a bidder constantly revises the 
estimate for his own valuation as well as for the maximum exit value of his opponents 
(conditional on him being the winner). The estimate revision is based on the observation 
of who is still active and who is not at any given price.
As more information gets aggregated, the ratio of those two values changes.
In particular a bidder may anticipate that the information that is going to be aggre­
gated is going to boost the expected maximum exit value of his opponents much more 
than his own valuation.
A jump cannot prevent the other bidders from acquiring further information, but it 
does provide them with a coarser information. A bidder may benefit from all bidders 
(including himself) aggregating a coarser information as this may in expected terms 
increase his valuation relatively to the second highest one.
Hence, rather than to scare his opponents as in Avery (1998), here the jump prevents 
them from getting the finer information they would need in order to be competitive.
Also in Fishman (1988) there is some pre-emption of information. In his model
9It is not robust to small trembles, i.e. if the strong type erroneously quits at lower prices it is strictly 
optimal for the weaker bidder to stay active till the value at which he would break even given his updated 
expectation regarding the value of the object. Such value is strictly greater than the one prescribed in
the proposed equilibrium.
10Furthermore, in some applications the bidders are firms that subsequently compete in the same
market. As pointed out by the literature on financial externalities, a firm that does not manage to get 
the resource on sale for itself could nonetheless try to make the winner pay the highest possible price to
more severely affect its financial resources.
11 An independent work by Ettinger (2006) also presents two examples characterized by this motivation.
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though a bidder is pre-empted from buying information. No information acquisition is 
needed in our model. More fundamentally, there it is the signaling that induces pre­
emption of information and not the mere act of placing a jump.
Compared with the standard setting in which discontinuous increases in the price are 
not allowed, the game where jump bidding is allowed is characterized by larger strategy 
sets. This makes the setting truly dynamic, more realistic as far as many applications 
are concerned, but also far richer and complex from a strategic point of view. The cost 
we need to pay for not looking at a ’’well behaved” environment is that we cannot have 
a framework as general as Avery (1998) and have clear cut predictions. Our objective 
though is precisely to start shading some light on what may happen when we consider 
a dynamic environment and to stress how apparently small differences from one setting 
to another may completely overturn the predictions in terms of revenues and efficiency.
We use the following structure. In section 2 we present the general setting and the 
auction rules. In section 3 we analyze why jumps may arise in equilibrium and how they 
affect the aggregation of information. In section 4 we introduce a few more strategically 
complex scenarios to illustrate the rich strategic implications that can arise once bidders 
are allowed to call a price. Section 5 presents a completely symmetric setting. Finally, 
section 6  concludes.
3.2 Auction setting
3.2.1 E nvironm ent
In the present paper we analyze a modification of the Japanese Auction (JA), which 
aims to capture the truly dynamic features of the English Auction (EA) that cannot be 
represented when adopting the standard JA format.
A set N  of i := l..n  bidders is present at the start of the auction. No further 
entry takes place after the auction has started and the decision to exit the auction is 
irreversible. Bidders valuations are interdependent, i.e. where V{ is bidder
i ’s value function, U G Ti is the private signal bidder % is endowed with at the start of 
the auction and G T_j represents the vector of the other bidders’ signals, i.e. it is 
a short cut notation for the vector While the information about U is private to
bidder t, the value functions v\ as well as the cumulative distribution functions, Fi(ti), 
from which the signals U are independently drawn, are common knowledge among the 
bidders.
We assume to depart the least possible from the standard assumptions made in the
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auction literature that the function Vi(.) is strictly increasing in t* and weakly increasing 
in tj for any tj. This assumption if anything imposes some regularity to the setting 
that works against the natural arise of jumps. We show in the last section that in 
such ’’standard” setting no jump can arise in equilibrium when we restrict to symmetric 
settings. 12
Moreover, even though a hiding information motivation and a signaling motivation 
may coexist and often will, we do not consider such possibility here as we want to isolate 
the effect that a jump may be used to pre-empt the acquisition of finer information. 
Further, the point that jump bidding can be used to signal a strong type has already 
been made elsewhere. This is achieved by assuming that after a jump has hidden some 
information any bidder bids up to his expected value given the information that can be 
gathered exclusively by observing which bidders are active at any given price p, that is 
we exclude that a bidder may quit before his break even price is reached as a result of 
some other bidder signaling to have a higher valuation. 13This is essentially a restriction 
on bidders’ beliefs.
Finally, we assume that there are no bidding or entry costs. Again allowing for a 
signaling explanation or for bidding costs would only make it easier to construct equilibria 
where a jump can profitably be used.
3.2 .2  A u ction  R ules
The rules of the auction are as follows. The price starts from a very low value and 
it is increased at a constant pace by an exogenous devise such as a clock. 14 Bidders 
are considered as active only if they are currently pressing a button. At any point in 
time, i.e. at any price p indicated by the clock at a specific instant of time, each bidder 
i faces a decision problem with three alternatives: exit at p by releasing the button, 
remain active by keep pressing the button and, finally, call a price. The identity of the 
bidders who quit is publicly revealed so that a bidder knows exactly against whom he
12The fact that the signals are unidimensional is a restriction. Our main insights should nonetheless
hold in the more complex multi-dimensional setting.
13This excludes that a jump could be used with a signaling motivation, so if it is used it must certainly
be due to the hiding motivation. In general, though, we should take care of the fact that a jump bid by
bidder i, as a side effect of hiding information, may convey information regarding his type that makes
the jump less profitable. Such tradeoff is not present in the settings we look at as in most of them the
signal of the bidder who jumps does not affect the opponents’ valuations.
14The starting price is low enough so that all bidders wish to participate. We normalize this value to 
zero.
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is still competing. Using his third option a bidder can interrupt the exogenous price 
increase and the clock is then stopped at the price indicated at that time and then reset 
at the price that has been called. In case more than one bidder simultaneously stop 
the clock, the identity of the bidder to whom the right of calling the price is assigned is 
randomly selected by the auctioneer. We refer to the k-th jump arising in equilibrium 
as J lk, k : 1..K, where % is the identity of the bidder placing the k-th jump . 15 Such jump 
is defined by the pair (pk,pk*), where pk is the price at which the clock is stopped and 
Pk* > Pk is price that is called. We can then represent bidder i ’s decision at p by 
diip) (E {exit, active, pk*}. The jumps are ordered so that k > k iff p*„ > p*kf. Let k{p) 
instead be the cardinality of the set of jumps that took place up to price p. After a jump 
Jk all the bidders that were active at price pk need to independently decide whether 
they want to be active also at price pk*; the identity of the bidders who do not match 
the jump is publicly revealed. The auction ends either when a price is called and no 
other bidder matches it or when in the continuous price increase phase the last but one 
bidder quits. In the first case the winning bid is given by the price that was called, in 
the second by the the price at which the last but one bidder exited.
3.3 Analysis o f Jumps
There is a general wisdom that price jumps are used by bidders as anticompetitive 
instruments that typically reduce efficiency and revenues and advantage only the bidder 
which makes use of them. We show that this is not true in general. As letting more 
information aggregate may not always be a good idea, similarly altering the precision 
of the information that bidders receive may not always have negative effects. We also 
illustrate that even if no jumps occur in equilibrium, the equilibrium outcome can be 
severely affected by the mere possibility of calling a price. Conversely, if a jump is 
observed in equilibrium, we cannot infer that the bidder who placed the jump is better 
off than in the game where jumps are not allowed. We introduce a few of these more 
strategically sophisticated settings later on, for now we start with the simpler scenario 
presented in the introduction.
15The act of calling a price is publicly observable, hence the identity of the bidder who places the jump 
is common knowledge.
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3.3.1 A  very  sty lized  exam ple
Let us start by modelling in the most stylized way the situation described in the intro­
duction.
Recall that a novice bidder was assumed to compete against a group of car dealers 
for the allocation of a second hand car and that the active presence of many expert car 
dealers would signal him that the car is of good quality (scenario under which he holds 
the highest valuation) . 16 The following value functions capture the main ingredients of 
such scenario.
• vCl = tc  1, tc 1 e  { f }, P r(tc  1 =  \)  =  P r(tCl = f) =  \
• vC 2  = tC2, tC 2  e  {§, ±}, P r(tc 2 =  §) =  P r(tC 2  = \)  = \
• vN = tN, if (tCl,tc 2) ^  ( f , 5 ); vN = tN + 1 , otherwise; tN = 0
Note that in the event that tc 1 = § the first car dealer (C\) holds a higher valuation 
than the second car dealer (C2), but potentially a lower valuation than the novice bidder 
(N).
In such scenario C\ has an incentive to hide the exact drop out value of C2 . To 
see why note that C\ anticipates that if he does not stop the clock his profits are equal 
to ttci = 5  * ( 5  — | )  +  5 * 0  =  5  (as half of the times he looses against N). Instead, 
by stopping the clock at any price strictly lower than |  and calling a price of his 
profits are equal to t!c  = 1 * ( |  — =  =  7:qx. This is so as the novice bidder
remains uncertain about the quality of the car and he is forced to drop out when the 
price reaches his expected valuation, i.e. at E(vN\tN = 0, tc 2 £ {§, ^}) =  C\ then 
wins with probability one and pays which makes the jump bid profitable. 17
Before exploring when and why placing a jump may be profitable, let us have a closer 
look at how the possibility of calling a price affects the aggregation of information.
3.3 .2  Inform ation A ggregation  and Jum ps
The underlying assumption in this paper is that once the auction has started the only
additional information to the private one that a bidder receives at the start is given by
observing who is still active and who is not.
In other words we exclude that a jump can be used to communicate the bidder’s own 
type to the opponents. An implication of this is that even though the overall information
16The focus on the cax market is purely illustrative.
17We use the tilde sign to denote random variables.
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publicly available includes also the jump bids that were matched by all of the bidders 
active at the time of the jump, those bids do not affect the equilibrium behavior.
The information that is publicly available at price p is assumed to be common knowl­
edge and we represent it using the vector h(jp), where h(p) G H{jp) can also be viewed 
as the realized history up to price p, out of the set of all possible histories H(p). To be 
more precise h(p) is a vector with n entries, hi(p), i : l..n, where hi(p) represents the 
information regarding bidder i that is publicly available at p.
Each entry hi(p) consists of three items, (Ji(p), Jk,di(p)). The first item is a vector 
containing all the jumps placed by bidder i up to price p, i.e. Jk G Jiijp) iff fc < fc(p); 
Ji(p) =  0, if bidder i has yet to place a jump.
The second entry records the jump by some bidder j  ^  i that is not matched by 
bidder i that consequently exits the auction (if bidder i is still active or has dropped 
while the price was being raised continuously such entry displays the value 0).
To the third entry we assign value p if bidder i has not dropped yet at price p; value 
Pi if bidder i has dropped at some price pi < p; finally, value pk, if all that is known 
is that bidder i was active at pk but did not match the price call p*k made by bidder 
j .  Clearly, di(p) is strictly increasing until bidder i drops out and then stays constant. 
Taking p as an upper bound on bidders’ highest possible valuation and assuming that 
no rational bidder would stay active over p, we can define di over the closed interval 
[0,p]. Then, di(p) identifies bidder *’s drop-out value. Also, let dm = maxi (di(p)) be 
the highest drop-out value (or in other words the realized winning price).
We denote bidder’s i optimal strategy by s*. In general a strategy Si needs to specify 
an action a*(p) at any price and for any possible realized type t{ and history h(p), i.e. 
di(jp) establishes a mapping from Ti x H(p) into {exit, active,pk*}. All bidders’ actions 
are taken simultaneously and the resulting new information produced is immediately 
updated in h as follows.
If Uj(p) =  quit, then for all p > p, di(p) =  p < p ; if a*(p) =  active, then di(p) =  p , 
for all p > p until a different information becomes available; finally, if Oj(p) =  pk*, then 
Jk is stored in the first entry of hi (p ) for all p > p.
Conversely, if p is the price that was called by some bidder j  ^  i and bidder’s i 
decision is exit then d*(p) =  p*k, for p > p*k ', if instead bidder’s i decision is active, then 
diip) = Pi until a new information becomes available.
Note that H(p) records simply who is still active and who is not at price p, what 
is known of the drop-out values of the bidders who already quitted and all previous 
histories of jumps. A different object is the information regarding each others valuations
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that the bidders can infer from such vector.
With this respect, let Dj(ti,h(p), s^) = E(dj(p)\ti = U, h(p), s^), be the expected 
drop-out value of bidder j  evaluated at p, by bidder z, given his private information, the 
information publicly available, and his strategy s*. As a matter of fact, the expected 
drop-out value of bidder j  depends also on the information that he is able to aggregate 
during the auction and such information can be manipulated by bidder i through s*. The 
vector h(p),Si)^j represents the relevant information that bidder i can infer
regarding his opponents at price p. Bidder i in particular is interested in the expected 
maximum exit value of his opponents, which we denote by Dlm(ti,h(p),Si). In fact, 
among all possible strategies he should pick s* as the one that maximizes at any given p 
the expected difference between his value and the maximum exit value of his opponents 
(conditional on the latter being lower than former). This should start to give some ideas 
about the complexity we may run into, were we to analyze a fully general set-up. We 
do not tackle such very complicated dynamic game here, instead we focus our attention 
to a few selected settings. Even restricting to very simplified scenarios, the implication 
that we obtain are quite rich.
To clarify the effect of a jump on the vector H(p), suppose that bidder z is con­
templating to jump from pk to p*k and assume for simplicity that if z does not place 
the jump no one else will before the price reaches p*k . The jump affects only those 
entries for which di(pk) = p*k. The value that is assigned to some of those entry at pk* 
if the price is raised continuously and some bidder j  /  i  quits a price pj E (pk,pk*) is 
d M * ) = pj < pk*. Conversely, if a jump is placed only the coarser information Jk could 
become available.
What we want to point out is that after the jump, the entry hj(p**) will not neces­
sarily record Jk but could rather record dj(pk*) = p k * . 1 8  Similarly, if in the continuous 
price increase case we had that dj(pk*) = pk*, with the jump we could have that Jk is 
recorded in the second component of hj.
This is to say that the jump by affecting the structure of the information recorded 
in H(p), it affects the information that can be inferred from it and in turn who is going 
to be active at a any given price.
3.3.3 Profitable Jum ps: C osts V s. G ains
When is the case that the gains from a jump outweigh its costs? What factors do 
influence such comparison? In this section we identify a couple of typical scenarios
18 An illustration of this can be found in the setting that follows.
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where the arise of a jump is more likely.
We start from a setting where no jumps arise in equilibrium. Then we show which
variations of such basic set up can lead to an environment which is instead favorable to
the arise of jumps.
In the example we propose, one of the bidders (bidder 2) always holds the highest 
value and wins the auctions. The example could be easily be made more realistic to 
allow for all bidders winning the object with some strictly positive probability. This 
formulation is just meant to pinpoint in the easiest possible way the key aspects we want 
to capture. Also, the use of pointwise distributions is made to render the equilibrium 
analysis easier, but it is to necessary to reach our results. The same considerations hold 
for the examples that follow.
• vi =  ti, ti = 2;
• v2  = t2, t2  = {5 , 1}; P r(t2  = \)  = P r(t2  = 1) =  ±
• V3  = t3, if t 2  = 5 ; v3  = t 3  +  §, if t 2  = 1 ; £3 =  \
Of the three bidders, bidder 1 and bidder 2 have private values and have a weakly 
dominant strategy to stay active up to their valuation regardless of whether the price is 
raised in a continuous or discontinuous fashion. Conversely, bidder’s 3 valuation depends 
on bidder’s 2 value so that his exit value differers whether or not he gets to know the 
exact realization of it.
If the information ”t 2  = 1” is aggregated the valuation of bidder 3 increases substan­
tially compared to the one of bidder 1, with the latter ending up loosing the auction. 
We need to check whether bidder 1 might have an incentive to pre-empt bidder 3 from 
getting such information.
The least costly way bidder 1 can do so is to jump from a value ’’slightly” lower 
than  ^ to 1. This induces bidder 3 to stay active until his expected valuation given 
the information available, i.e. E(vs\t2  G { |,  1}) =  §. Under the jump, bidder 1 wins 
\  with certainty, while without it he wins only with probability but a much higher 
sum ( |) ,  which guarantees a higher expected profit. Hiding information is therefore not 
profitable.
Even though the expected drop-out value of bidder 3 is the same in both scenarios, 
the probability that bidder 1 wins is affected, which in turn means that the expected 
price he pays conditional on winning is different.
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It is useful in order to understand which factors may favor the arise of a jump to 
compare its costs with its benefits.
Let us from now on indicate by J  = {p*,p**) a generic jump that a bidder might 
contemplate placing.
It seems natural to define the cost of a jump in the following way.
Definition 3.1. The cost for bidder i of placing a jump J, Cj(J), is the foregone profit 
of not being able to win at a price p 6 {p*,p**)-
In the setting above it is easy to verify that ci(J) =  ^ ( |  — 5 ) =  ^, where J  = ( | ,  1). 
It is to be pointed out that in general the price paid in the foregone opportunity scenario 
can be strictly higher than the price called (here for instance it is equal to |  > 1 =  p**).
Definition 3.2. The potential gains for bidder i of placing a jump J , g%{J), are given 
by expected increase in profits in the event that the price paid without the jump would 
have been higher than p**.
We can verify that gi{J) = — 0) =  \  < c\(J), where J  =  (^,1). We refer
to gi(J) as ”potential” gains as the change in profits conditional to the event that the 
price paid without the jump would have been higher than p** does not have to be posi­
tive. A jump though will be placed only if such value is positive and outweighs the costs.
The next two settings provide simple variations of the one above. Let us start by 
adding an extra bidder (bidder 4).
• vi = fy, ti =  2;
• v2  = t2, t2  = { 5 , 1}; P r(t2  = \ )  = P r(t2  = 1) =  \
• ^3  =  t3, if t 2  = v3  = t 3  +  §, if t 2  =  1 ; t 3  = \
• V4  = £4 , £4 =  5
The only bidder that might place a jump is still bidder 1. The optimal jump to 
consider is the same as before and so are the profits he can make using such jump, i.e.
Instead, if the jump J  is not placed, the event that is favorable to bidder 1 happens 
with probability  ^as in the original setup, but the presence of bidder 4 limits the amount 
of profits that can be made to 2 — |  =  The expected profits realized in the game where 
J  is not placed are then = \  * \  = \  < \  = We should expect a jump to arise in
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equilibrium. Indeed we have that g\(J \ ) =  0) = \  > ci(J i) — 0? where J \  =  (^, 1).
We move to the second variation. Here two extra bidders are added: bidder 4 is 
symmetric to bidder 2 and bidder’s 5 interdependence with bidder’s 4 value is symmetric 
to bidder’s 3 interdependence with bidder’s 4 value.
• V! = ti, h  = 2;
• v2  = t2, t 2  = {±, 1}; P r(t2  = =  P r(t2  = l) = \
• Vs =  *3 , if t 2  = V3  = t 3  +  §, if t 2  = 1; t 3  = \
• V4  = u , u  =  {5 ,1}; Pr(U  =  5 ) =  P r(t2  = 1) =  \
• v5  = t5, if U = v5  = t 5  +  if U — 1; 5^ =  \
Again, the optimal jump for bidder 1 is the same so that his profits from placing a 
jump are also unchanged. With such jump neither bidder 3 nor bidder 5 can discover 
their exact valuation and stay active until their expected valuation. Since -£7(^ 31^ 2 £ 
{^,1}) =  E(v 5 \t2  G {5 , 1 }) =  §, this leaves again bidder 1 with a sure profit of 7^  =
The profits from not jumping are instead lower than in the original setting as the 
event where bidder 1 can profit is now ”t 2  = / \  ” £ 4  =  (rather than just ” £2 =
which happens with a lower probability. The profits in the event of not placing the jump 
J  are then 7ri =  \  * |  =  |  < \  =  7r^, so that in equilibrium a jump is placed.
We can also verify that g\(J\) =  |( ^  — 0) =  § > c\(J\) =  | ( |  — 5 ) =  J-
The jump has become profitable both because its cost has gone down and the deriving 
gains gone up.
The above setting points out not just that the same jump can affect the bidding 
behavior of severable bidders, but more importantly that if the hidden finer information 
that would have been relevant is not the same for all of them, then the more likely it 
is that a jump can profitably be used. The reason is that the probability that one of 
those bidders could have observed a favorable information becomes higher. Essentially 
because max (E(vs\t2  G {^, l} ) ,E (v 4 \t2  G {^, 1})) < E (max(vz,V4 )\t2  G {5 ,1}).
To sum up this section suggests the following:
1. The more uncorrelated the amount of information a jump hides, the more profitable 
the jump as the lower the cost and the higher the gains deriving from it.
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2. The more intense is competition the lower the probability that the bidder who 
jumped could have won at a price lower than the one called.
3.4 A Strategically Complex Environment
In the previous section we introduced a few simple examples where only one bidder had 
an incentive to jump. Here we look at how the possibility that someone else might jump 
affects the strategic interaction. We show that a bidder may be induced to jump by the 
anticipation of someone else hiding some information later on; viceversa, a bidder may 
also be induced to quit earlier than he would otherwise do.
Non obvious results are nonetheless raised also by the scenario where only one bidder 
is allowed (or has an incentive) to jump.
In section 4.2, for instance, we are able to show that being allowed to jump when 
all other bidders are not, need not to be a strategic advantage. As a matter of fact, a 
bidder could be willing to pay the seller (or the auctioneer) not to be allowed to jump.
Another interesting point is that even if a bidder’s expected profits were to increase 
(when allowed to jump), it does not follow that the seller’s profits are reduced. In fact, as 
well illustrated by Ettinger (2006), while the seller’s profits conditional on the bidder who 
jumps being the winner decrease, the profits conditional on some other bidder winning 
may increase. The second effect can outweigh the first.
In general, however, it is true that the more the bidders who have an incentive to 
place one or more jumps, the more exponentially complex the dynamic game becomes 
and the richer the strategic implications that may derive.
To keep things as simple as possible here we restrict our attention to settings where 
figuring out the optimal jump is immediate.
3.4.1 A  P areto  w orse equilibrium
Let us refer to the game where jumps are not allowed and the price is raised continuously 
as the C game. Vice versa, we refer to the game where all bidders are allowed to jump 
as the J game.
We provide first an illustration where the equilibrium in the J game can be ranked 
as pareto worse than the one in the C game. In particular, the setting allows us to make 
the following points:
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1. A bidder can be induced to jump by the anticipation that another bidder may 
strategically hide some relevant information (via a jump) later on in the auction.
2. Even though in equilibrium jump bids are used, all bidders would be better off in 
the C game.
3. Both revenues and efficiency are higher in the C game. Even stronger, the J 
equilibrium can be ranked as pareto worse than the C equilibrium as everybody is 
worse off.
• vi = h; h  e  {0, ^ } , P r(ti = 0) =  P r(ti =  \
• V2  = t 2 , if ti = 0; V2  = t 2  +  §, if ti = ^  =  0
• v3  = t3; t 3  € {0, ^ } , Pr{t3  =  0) =  P r(t3  = \
• V4 =  U, if t 3  =  0 ; U4 =  U +  §, if *3 =  ^5 U = 0
•  V§ =  t 5 ; 5^ ^  { 2 ’ 5 } ’ =  2 )  =  F>r(t' 5  —  5 )  =  2
• v& = t e,  if t 5  = 5 ; Ve = t 2 +  2 , if t 5 = t 6 = 0
Let us start with the analysis of the C game. Bidders j  : 1,3,5 know their valua­
tion and stay active up to that price. The valuation of a bidder j  +  1 depends on the 
value of bidder j .  It is important to notice that bidder 2 and 4 can find out about 
their exact valuation before bidder 6  can, by staying active over p =  0. In equilibrium 
they quit immediately if respectively bidder 1 or bidder 3 quits. Vice versa, they stay 
active till the price equals |  if £i =  ^  or £3 =  ^  respectively. In this latter scenario 
bidder 6  can find out his value without incurring any loss as either bidder 2 , bidder 
4 or both are active over the price of Bidder 6  then quits at price \  if bidder 5 
does so and stays active until price equals 2, otherwise. If instead both bidders 1 and 
3 quit at p =  0 also bidders 2 and 4 will. Nonetheless, the same strategy for bidder 6  
remains optimal as ^ * ( 0  — \ )  + {2— | )  =  ^  > 0 .  The revenues for the seller are
R c  =  i * ( i * i  +  i * 4 ) + i ( i  + i _ |_ i  + 3 ) + i ( i 3|t3 +  i + 3) = 83 The expected value of the
winner (efficiency) instead is E c  = T*(^*0 -|-^*2 )-b^(5 *§ +  ^*2)-+-5 (5 *§ +  5 *2) =  | | .
We turn now to the J game. Again bidder 1, 3 and 5 know their value and stay active 
up to that price. We first focus on bidder 2 (bidder 4 is symmetric) and check if and 
when he can find profitable to jump. There are only two possibilities: either he jumps 
before he finds out his exact value or after. In the first case the jump is not profitable
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as his ex ante expected value equals |  which is less than the value at which he should 
jump in order to hide some relevant information. Bidder 2 can get to know whether 
his value is 0 or |  at no cost as he can quit immediately if t\ = 0. In the subgame 
where he finds out that his value equals |  and that bidder 4 has quitted, we need to 
compare the profits he can get from calling a price with the ones from letting the price 
increase without a stop (if bidder 4 also found out that his value is |  the comparison 
is irrelevant as the profits would be zero in both cases). If no price is called bidder’s 2 
profits are | * ( |  — | )  +  ^ * 0  =  Instead by hiding information stopping the clock at 
any price in (0, and calling the price of |  the profits are § — l  =  ^ > ^ ( a s  bidder 
6 in this case is not able to infer his exact valuation and bids according to his expected 
one) so that a jump is indeed profitable. Note that under bidder’s 2 jump (or bidder 4) 
bidder 6 never wins. We now look for bidder’s 6 optimal strategy. In equilibrium bidder 
6 anticipates that if at least one of bidder 2 and bidder 4 finds out that his value is | ,  
he is going to loose the auction. That happens with probability | .  With probability \  
instead he is going compete with bidder 5 only, which yields him an expected profit of 
1 ( 5  * (0 — 5 ) +  \  * (2 — |) )  =  The only other option bidder 6 has is to jump at 
the very start of the auction. In this case he needs to jump to the value of ^  so that 
bidder 2 and 4 are not able to find out their exact valuations. Since bidders 2 and 4 
expected values are lower than they cannot match the jump. In such case, bidder 6 
always wins and makes a profit o f l  — 10 ^  nj > In equilibrium we should expect the 
auction to clear immediately with bidder 6 calling such price. This gives to the seller 
revenues RJ = ^  < | |  =  Rc . Efficiency also drops as the expected value of the winner 
is E J =  ^ * 0 + | * 2  =  l <  f§ =  (b^der 6 is always the winner). Also, the only 
bidder that is able to make some profit is bidder 6 and the profits he makes are lower 
than in the C game as he gets ^  instead of Interestingly, allowing bidders to call a 
price in this setting makes everybody worse off including the bidder placing the jump.
In the next section we analyze settings where the bidders may be active at prices 
where conditional on winning they would make a loss. This happens as the expected 
profits that they are able to make at higher prices more than compensate such losses. 
We find such settings particularly interesting as there the aggregation of information 
allowed by open auctions can potentially be very powerful in boosting revenues and 
efficiency. At the same time though we are able to show that a standard open auction 
that does not allow for price calls sometimes creates perverse incentives that may impede 
the aggregation of information. Allowing for jumps can sometimes surprisingly increase
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both revenues and efficiency.
3.4.2 Jum ps, Inform ation  A ggregation  and a Free-R ider P roblem
Open formats enable to learn extra information during the course of the auction. In 
general a bidder may be active at prices where conditional on winning he makes a loss. 
This happens if he anticipates that with some probability he may profitably win at higher 
prices and that such expected gains outweigh the expected losses.
If competition is strong the expected cost of being active can be extremely low. Even 
though the first intuition may be that this should induce more bidders to be active for 
longer, thus improving the information they hold and resulting in higher revenues and 
efficiency, in general this does not have to be the case.
Compte and Jehiel (2004) provide a private value model where such intuition holds 
true. With some probability bidders may receive a better estimate about their private 
valuation at some exogenously determined random time. If there are enough bidders 
in the auction it may be profitable for some of them ”to wait and see” for favorable 
information. Such possibility raises both efficiency and revenues. A similar insight is 
also present in Compte and Jehiel (2007); there a bidder may stay active beyond his 
initial expected valuation to observe the strength of the competition. Only in the event 
that competition is not intense, a bidder would invest to get to know his exact valuation.
Here we provide two illustrative settings. The first one provides an interdependent 
value scenario where the private information that bidders hold is aggregated in a very 
desirable way thanks to the possibility of ’’wait and see”. Allowing bidders to call a 
price instead causes both efficiency and revenues to drop.
The second setting provides a new insight. The information there fails to aggregate 
precisely because the low cost of staying active if there are other competitors active 
may lead to an instance of the free rider-problem that results in no bidder ultimately 
be willing to acquire information, where acquiring information in our case simply means 
stay active in order to be able to update the estimate of your valuation. The possibility 
of jump bidding here allows the bidder with the ex-ante higher valuation to hide the 
piece of information causing such free-rider problem and to profitably win the auction. 
This boosts both efficiency and revenues.
We start with the scenario where the aggregation of information is very smooth.
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Such setting also illustrates the following points:
1. The anticipation of a future jump may induce a bidder to quit earlier than he 
would in the C game.
2. Even though no jump is observed in equilibrium, the equilibrium outcome in the 
J game substantially differs from the one in the C game.
• vi = t u h  =  { |,  f , 1}, Pr{ti = |) )  =  Pr{ti =  |) )  =  P r(h  = 1) =  ±
• V2  = t 2 , if h  = \]V 2  — t 2  + §, otherwise; t 2  = 0
• V3  = t3, if h  € {§, §}; v3  = t 3  +  2, otherwise; t 3  = 0
The key feature of this setting is that both for bidder 2 and for bidder 3 winning the 
object at a low price (at p = | )  entails a big loss as it means that bidder 1 signal was 
low and consequently that they both value the object zero. It can be easily checked that 
in a sealed bid SPA this fact implies that both bidder 2 and bidder 3 would always bid 
zero. Then, bidder 1 would win regardless of his signal at a price of zero.
Conversely, if bidders are not allowed to jump the Japanese auction allows the infor­
mation to be aggregated in a very desirable way. Essentially what happens is that the 
open format allows bidder 2 and bidder 3 to ” share” the risk of winning at a low price. 
Note that if only one of them were present in the auction, he would not find profitable
to stay active at low prices and he would rather quit immediately. What is crucial is
that the two bidders can also ” split” the benefits of being active at higher prices in a 
way that allows both to recover the expected losses.
The bidders’ strategies are as follows. Bidder 1 stays active until his private value is 
reached. Bidder 2 quits as soon as bidder 1 quits if that happens at a price less or equal 
than | ,  and stays active until the price reaches | ,  otherwise. Bidder 3 quits as soon as 
bidder 1 quits if that happens at a price less or equal than | ,  and stays active until the 
price reaches 2, otherwise. This way bidder 2 and bidder 3 ’’share” an expected loss of 
I  * I  * |  =  I  each in the event that t\  =  | .  The benefits more than compensate: bidder 
2, if t\ =  | ,  gets an expected profit of |  * ( |  — | )  =  ^  and bidder 3, if t\ = 1, gets an 
expected profit of |  * (2 — | )  =  The revenues are then R c  — + +  =
which is substantially more than zero as in the SPA. Similarly, the expected value of the 
winner (measuring efficiency) is E c  = | * 0 + ^ * |  +  5 * 2  =  which is bigger than 
+  +  =  ^  in the SPA. The ability of open formats to aggregate infor­
mation in the course of the auction boosts both revenue and efficiency. What happens
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if we allow for jumps?
In that case the smooth sharing of costs and benefits is unattainable. Recall that 
bidder 2 and 3 can be active at low prices only if they do so jointly. Note that if t\ ^  | ,  
bidder 2 is going to learn that v2  = \ ,  while bidder 3 is still uncertain regarding his 
exact value. Bidder 2 can ’’hide” such information to bidder 3 by calling a price equal to 
1 when the current price is still in ( | ,  |) .  In such event bidder 2 makes a sure profit of \  
(bidder 3 would stay active until E{v^\t\ E { f , 1}) =  1), while if he lets the price increase 
continuously he can win only in the event that t\ = | ,  which yields 5  * (f — f ) =  Jj < \- 
Bidder 2 cannot commit not to call such a price. But then bidder 3 anticipating that 
bidder’s 2  jump will pre-empt him from winning in the only event in which it is profitable, 
he is no longer willing to stay active over t\ = \ .  Since bidder’s 3 presence is necessary 
for bidder 2 , the equilibrium outcome is that they both quit the auction immediately. 
This brings zero revenues and it inefficiently allocates the object always to bidder 1 as 
in the SPA.
It is important to point out that without being fully aware of the implications of 
allowing bidders to call a price, the seller may be wrongly induced to believe that the 
bidders’ valuations were very low. The setting just presented also implies the following 
result.
P roposition  3.1. A bidder may be willing to pay not to be allowed to call a price even 
in the event that he were the only bidder granted such option.
Proof. Take the setting above where bidder 2 is the only bidder allowed to jump. Since
in the J game he never wins, he would be willing to pay up to the expected profits he
makes in the C game to restrict his strategies space to the choice of quitting or stay 
active alone.
□
We turn to the second setting. This setting shows that:
1. In the C game perverse incentives may impede the aggregation of information.
2. The enlarged strategy set of the J game may alleviate such problem and bring 
higher revenues and efficiency.
• vi = th h  = { ^ ,  1}, Pr{t\ = ^ ) )  =  Pr(t 1 =  1) =  \
• v2  = t2, t 2  = f , if ti  =  jq',v2  =  t 2 +  5 , if *i =  1
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• v3  = *3 , t 3  = 0, if ti  =  =  t 3  +  if ti = 1
The framework is similar to the previous one in so fax as both bidder 2 and bidder 3 
may have an incentive to ’’wait and see”. Differently from the previous setting though 
one of the bidders (bidder 2) has an ex-ante value higher than bidder 1. This means 
that if bidder 2 were the only bidder competing with bidder 1, he would profitably be 
active over the price of to be able to infer the realization of t\. The same is not true 
for bidder 3.
Bidder 3 could potentially benefit from the active presence of bidder 2 over the price 
of The problem is that if both bidders are active at that price the expected losses 
are shared but the expected gains are not. In fact, if bidder 3 infers that t\ = 1, he 
always wins against bidder 2. But then bidder 2 prefers to stay active only until |  to 
avoid incurring in a loss. In turn if bidder 2 quits before the price reaches ^  (else said 
he does not ’’wait and see”), so will bidder 3, as the latter one has an expected value 
lower than bidder 1. Hence, no aggregation of information is possible.
The equilibrium strategies are the following. Bidder 1 quits at his privately known 
value; bidder 2 quits when the price reaches bidder 3 quits as soon as bidder 2 quits 
if that happens for a price less or equal than ^  and stays active until | ,  otherwise. The 
auction clearly performs very poorly as bidder 1 always wins for a price of | ,  which 
implies that both revenues and efficiency would be higher if bidder 3 were excluded from 
the competition.
Let us now look at the J game. Bidder’s 2 ex-ante expected value is bigger then the 
one of both bidder 1 and bidder 3. While in the C game bidder 2 cannot do anything to 
prevent bidder 3 from free-riding on his presence, in the J game he can affect bidder’s 2 
bidding behavior by hiding the relevant piece of information. He can do that by stopping 
the clock at any price lower than ^  and calling a price of 1. Doing so he wins at that 
price making an expected profit of ^  (his expected valuation is |^), which is better than 
in the C game where he never wins. Revenues go up from R c  =  |  in the C game to 
R J = 1 in the J game. Similarly, the expected value of the winner (efficiency) increases 
from E c  =  5 * ^  +  5 * l =  |§ in  the C game to E J — 5 * f  +  5* i §  =  fn i n ^ game’
This allows us to conclude the section with the following result.
P roposition  3.2. Allowing bidders to call a price can decrease or increase revenues. The 
result is sensitive to the specific setting analyzed. The same conclusion holds regarding 
the format’s efficiency.
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Proof. We only need to provide examples where all those possibilities are covered. The 
setting in section 4.1 proves that revenues and efficiency can drop. The setting above 
proves that they can increase.
□
3.5 Symmetric settings
The reader may wonder whether some asymmetries in the setting are needed for jumps 
to arise in equilibrium. The answer is that asymmetries are not needed and the same 
insights could be delivered starting from symmetric settings. Asymmetric settings were 
simply more flexible in allowing us to generate examples that could convey in the easiest 
possible way the main insights.
The following example introduces a completely symmetric setting in which those 
bidders receiving the highest signal have an incentive to strategically jump bid in order 
to hide the drop-out values of bidders with lower signals.
Here we relax the assumption that bidders valuations are strictly increasing in their 
own type. Proposition 4 shows that under the standard valuation structure assumed 
in the literature, no jump is placed in equilibrium when a symmetric value model is 
assumed.
• i : 1, ..4 Bidders.
• Any bidder i receives a unidimensional independently drawn signal U G Ti, where 
Ti G {0, ±, §, 1}, and Pr{U =  0) =  Pr(U =  | )  =  Pr(U = \)  = Pr(U = §) =  
Pr(U = 1) =  ±.
• Vi(ti, t - i ) =  1, if ti = \  and tj > 0 for any j  ^  i;
• Vi(ti,t-i) = ti , otherwise.
In the setting above any type U ^  ^ knows his exact valuation as in a private value
model. Conversely, type U = \  needs to revise his expected valuation according to the
information he receives during the auction.
What is not standard is that if the vector of the opponents’ signals is strictly positive, 
a bidder of type U = ^ holds a value that is higher than the one of type ti = |  and equal 
to the one of type t\ = 1, i.e. as anticipated, Uj(£*,£_*) is not strictly increasing in ti , 
Vfcj, V£_i.
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To get an economic interpretation for this setting, recall the example of the novice 
bidder and the car dealers presented in the introduction. The same interpretation can 
be given here once we assume that there is ex-ante uncertainty regarding who is expert 
and who is not. Bidders are then ex-ante symmetric in that they privately know if they 
are novice or expert but they are not aware about the others’ ’’types” .
In particular, the example proposed fits such scenario if we think of bidders’ types 
other than U =  ^ as experienced bidders, and of bidders with type U = ^ as novice 
bidders.
The former are not influenced by the opponents’ estimates for the object , the latter 
ones are.
This is so as the interpretation was that the novice bidder really likes the car, but he 
is afraid it might be a bad bargain unless he observes that everybody attaches a fairly 
high value to it (in this parametrization this is given by the event ’’all expert bidders 
have a value strictly higher than zero”).
We show in the next proposition that such favorable information for type ti = \  
can profitably be hidden by a competitor of type tj = 1 calling a price of |  at the very 
beginning of the auction.
P roposition  3.3. The following strategies constitute a sequential equilibrium of the 
modified Japanese auction game, where the bidders’ value functions are as described 
above:
• i f UE  {0, |} , stay active until U.
• if U = ?j, stay active until ti, if for some j  ^  i, and p G (0, \) , dj(p) = 0; stay 
active until the price reaches 1 , if dj{p) = pj > 0, V? ^  i, for some p > 0 ; stay 
active until your expected value conditional on ti and on the public information 
H(p), otherwise.
• if U = 1  stop the clock at the very start of the auction and call a price of i.e. 
place a jump J{ = (0, ^), then stay active until the price reaches p = 1.
Proof. We first prove that bidders with types ti G {0, J, J, |}  cannot profitably jump. 
Then, we will show that the optimal jump for bidder ti = 1 is from the value of 0 to the 
value of i.e. J{ = (0, |) .
Note first that a jump affects an opponent j  behavior only if he is of type tj = \  
and it creates uncertainty on whether all other opponents k ^  { i,j}  are of type t^ >  0
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or not. The less costly way to create such an uncertainty is to bid \  as this is the lowest 
value at which the smallest type larger than t*. =  0 would also drop.
A type ti = 7} can only win against opponents with types tj E [0, |] , unless he finds 
out that tj > 0, Vtj . These types have a private valuation and their bidding is not 
influenced by a jump, which would be then unprofitable. A similar argument excludes 
that types U = 0 and U = \  can profitably jump. A type U = \  can also win against 
types tj =  |  and type tj = 1, but he certainly does not find profitable to hide to himself 
information that can render him more competitive (tj > 0, Vj) or make him quit at the 
right price (tj = 0, for some j) .
As for type =  | ,  the most ’’effective” jump he can place is from a value of 0 to \  
as placing a jump J  = (0,p**), with p** E (J, | )  would be more costly but would not 
affect type t j  = \  bidding behavior with respect to the jump proposed. We show that 
even such candidate jump cannot be profitable.
The price he pays (when winning) is affected by a jump only if at least one of the 
opponents is of type t j  =  and at least one of type 0 or |
The jump is not profitable in the subcases where only one of the two other bidders 
is of type 0 or as bidder t j  = ^ would bid up to his expected valuation that in such 
scenario equals to |  (so that bidder i would break even in expected terms as opposed 
to gaining positive profits without the jump). Finally, in the four subcases where two 
of the opponents are either 0 or bidder t j  =  \  would bid up to | .  Without the jump 
bid in three of the four cases t j  = \  would bid \  with a gain of |  and in the remaining 
case he would bid up to 1 and bidder i would forego a profit of |  obtainable with the 
jump. Also in this scenario then the jump is not profitable.
Finally, lets check that indeed type U = 1 can profitably jump.19 The candidate 
jump is again J\ =  (0, |) .  The same reason as above excludes any jump higher than 
that but lower than | .  It remains to exclude a jump J  = (0, | )  (as a jump above |  
would be more costly but add no gain).
Lets us condition on the event that no opponent of bidder i is of type t j  = 1, as in 
that case bidder i makes zero profits in all circumstances. To prove that the jump J  
is not profitable, note that his expected gain are bounded above by ( | |  * ^ )  * \  where 
the first product gives the probability of the event ”at least one bidder has drawn type 
t j  =  \  and the other two opponents have drawn a type t j  > 0” (which is exactly the event
19If there is more than one bidder with U =  1, the identity of the bidder to whom the jump is attributed 
is randomly selected.
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in which jumping is profitable) and \  is an upper bound on the gains. The expected 
losses are instead bounded below by such number as the first product indicates also the 
probability of the event ”at least one opponent has drawn type tj = 0 and the maximum 
type of the other two opponents is some h  < I ” , under which bidder i foregoes the 
possibility of winning for a price equal or lower than \  and the losses are bounded below
by \-
We now instead verify that the candidate jump is profitable.
Again the jump alters the price paid by bidder i only when at least one of the 
opponents is of type \  and at least one of type 0 or \  and none of type 1. One of the 
opponents can then be ’’freely” chosen to be of type 0, \  or | .  In the first three cases
the expected price paid by bidder i is the same with or without the jump. Without the 
jump i faces the uncertain distribution of ^ and 1, 20 while with the jump he pays the 
expected value of that.
In the last case (one bidder being of type tj =  |) ,  the jump becomes strictly prof­
itable as now in the uncertain distribution bidder i can no longer benefit from the 
event ”at least one bidder has signal 0” which for the previous cases was leading i 
to win at a price of ^.21 These gains exceed the cost of the jump which is given 
by the fact of foregoing the possibility of winning the object at price zero when all 
opponents have drawn a signal tj = 0. It is easy to verify that the expected prof- 
its without the jump a x e ]^ * 0  +  ^ * |  +  ^ * |  +  I| 5 * f  +  I| 5 * l  =  ^ a n d  
H * °  + ^ * i  +  I5 5 * l  +  ^ * 5  +  l i 5 * !  =  ^  with the jump.
The above proves that only type U = 1 jumps and what his optimal jump is. It is 
immediate to verify that the strategies of the remaining types are of equilibrium as they 
simply require them to stay active until their privately known value or their expected 
values given the information gathered during the auction.
□
The presence of a type ti = f  in the setting proposed is important in making the 
jump profitable. Note with this regard the similarities with the first setting that made 
the arise of a jump profitable in section 3.3. The type of insight provided is essentially 
the same (a more competitive environment under some circumstances can make the arise 
of a jump more likely) but the equilibrium analysis even in a fairly basic set up is far
20The first event has probability \  if only one bidder drops after the jump and probability f  if two
bidders drop. The second event of course has the residual probability.
21 The uncertain distribution is now over the values f  and 1.
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more complex.
The next proposition shows that in a symmetric setting with ” standard” value func­
tions no jumps arise in equilibrium.
It is well known that in the symmetric setting if the standard Japanese version of the 
English auction is assumed there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium where bidders 
drop-out values are fully revealing of their types. In such equilibrium the types of the 
bidders who drop become common knowledge and the remaining bidders use a bidding 
strategy that prescribes them to exit at the value that is obtained plugging in the value 
function the signals of the bidders who have already dropped and assigning to the types 
of the bidders that are still active the same type as their own (for details and a formal 
description, see for instance Krishna (2002) or the original paper by Milgrom and Weber 
(1982)). We show that such equilibrium remains the unique symmetric equilibrium even 
if bidders are allowed to jump.22 Hence, this result renders more robust the predictions 
for the standard symmetric Japanese version of the EA provided by the literature. Such 
result holds under the assumption made through out the paper that excludes that a 
jump can affect the expected valuation of a bidder or his beliefs through signaling.
P roposition  3.4. Assume that v ^ t ^ t - i )  is strictly increasing in ti for any profile of 
the opponents’ signals, t- i , and weakly increasing in tj for any j ,  then no jump (aimed 
at hiding information) can arise in the equilibrium of the symmetric value model.
Proof. □
Suppose that the conditions stated above are satisfied and that some jump bid is 
placed. We show that any such jump is not profitable and that the allocation and the 
price paid by the winner are the same as in the model where jumps are not allowed.
The strategy set is nonetheless enlarged and thus a strategy needs to specify how the 
bidder would react if some other bidder were to place a jump.
Let us assume that bidder i instead of following the action prescribed by the ’’stan­
dard” equilibrium strategy without jumps places the first jump, J |,  from p* to p**; we 
limit our analysis to the first jump only as a similar argument excludes that further 
jumps may emerge.
Up to the price reaches p* there is a unique symmetric bidding strategy that bidders 
can follow and it is the one described in the papers cited above. Using such strategy 
a bidder quits at a price at which he would break even were all the remaining active
22 Except the obvious complication that the bidding behavior in case a bidder deviates and places a 
jump needs to be specified.
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bidders to quit at the same time as him. Those studies show that such break even 
condition can be constructed.
Note also that, once the jump J\ = (p*,pj*) is placed, there must exist a threshold 
type (if any) that is just indifferent between matching the jump or not (with all bidders 
with a lower type quitting the auction). This is so as valuations are symmetric and 
strictly increasing in ti for any signal profile
Denote the set of bidders who decide to exit after observing the jump by E, and by 
E  the cardinality of the set. It then becomes publicly known that for any bidder e E E, 
te E where (te) is the inferred lower (upper) bound for te given that e was
active at p*, but not at p\*. Denote instead the active bidders by the set A, and by A
the cardinality of the set. The bidders who dropped prior to the jump than belong to 
the set N  — E  — A  and without loss of generality we can order them to be bidders 1 to 
N - E - A .
Compared to the scenario without jumps we have that after the jump is placed only 
only the coarser information te E [tg, te] becomes regarding any e E E.
Hence, we need to define what is the optimal action for a bidder that decides to be 
active after observing J\ for all possible histories that may unfold after that event.
Our claim is that any bidder a £ A  uses the symmetric bidding strategy b£ =
E(va |^l =  t \ , t 2 := t 2, •••? =  ^  [^e5^e]?6 E E]  t a =  t a ) CL E A ), to
determine when to drop in case the remaining active bidders (including himself) are A 
and where ta is the type of bidder a for whom we are evaluating the strategy.
Given the assumptions made, the bidding strategy is strictly increasing, hence it fully 
reveals the type of the bidders who quit. If no other jump follows, bidders drop in order 
(from the lowest type to the highest) at the price prescribed by the equilibrium strategy. 
The fact that no bidders can profitably deviate from such strategy follows from the same 
arguments as in the English auction without jumps to which we remand the reader.
The allocation that results is that the bidder with the highest type wins, and the 
price he pays is the expected value of the bidder with the second highest type, which 
is E(va\ti = t i , t 2  — t2, i£—A =  ^IV-E-Ai ^ [tejte\ie £ E \ta =  taiCL E ^4), for
A = 2.
Without the jump the price paid would have been
E{va\t\ = t i , t 2  — t2, •••itjj = tjj  te, e E E] ta = ta)o, E A\te E \te, te\), for 
A = 2. The two values are clearly the same. In other words, the gains from the jump 
are G( J{) = 0.
However, any candidate jump with strictly positive probability is not matched by
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some bidder,23 which given symmetry means that with strictly positive probability all 
bidders exit after the jump so that C( JJ) > 0. Hence, placing a jump cannot be prof­
itable.
23 As a jump that is matched by all bidders does not affect the bidding behavior given the assumptions 
made in this paper.
CHAPTER 3. HIDING INFORMATION IN  OPEN AUCTIONS 68
3.6 Conclusions
We have analyzed a truly dynamic version of the Japanese auctions where bidders are 
allowed to stop the continuous price increase to call a price at any point during the 
auction.
We have looked at how the possibility of calling a price affects the way information 
is aggregated and shown that bidders may have an incentive to alter the aggregation of 
information by placing jump bids to hide the drop-out value of some of their opponents.
There is a general wisdom that jumps are anticompetitive. We show that the envi­
ronment is so strategically rich that many things can happen. In particular, in situations 
where the aggregation of information would otherwise not be ”smooth”, the bigger flex­
ibility allowed by the larger strategy sets can alleviate an instance of the free-rider 
problem and improve the auction performance both in terms of revenues and efficiency.
This analysis brings powerful implications as it shows that the possibility of placing 
jump bids affects severely (though in general ambiguously) both revenues and efficiency.
In particular, when evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of open versus 
sealed bid format great care needs to be placed on whether the setting could be fa­
vorable to jump bids.
Chapter 4
Second B est Efficiency and 
English auctions
4.1 Introduction
In this paper we study mechanisms that maximize the expected social surplus generated 
by the sale of an indivisible unit subject to the buyers’ incentive compatibility con­
straints. This has been a fundamental question in the auction literature since Vickrey 
(1961) seminal paper.
Previous papers that have addressed this question, e.g. Maskin (1992), Maskin 
(2000), Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001), have focused on 
conditions that guarantee that the incentive compatibility constraints are not binding. 
For instance, when buyers have interdependent values, unidimensional type spaces, inde­
pendent types and we consider Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints, Dasgupta 
and Maskin (2000) has shown that the condition takes the form of a particular single 
crossing condition. This condition basically says that if it is efficient to allocate the good 
to one buyer for a given profile of types, it must also be efficient to allocate the good to 
this buyer when we increase her type keeping constant the types of the other buyers.1
We analyse a simple extension of the framework described in the paragraph above 
to allow for externalities. However, we depart from the existing auction literature and 
study efficiency when the incentive compatibility constraints are binding, i.e. when the 
single crossing condition does not hold.
Maskin (2000) gives a realistic example in which the single crossing condition may
1 Assuming that a buyer type’s space is ordered according to her value, this is, higher types correspond 
to higher values.
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fail. Suppose the sale of the right to drill for oil between two wildcatters. The first 
one has a high marginal cost and a low fixed cost whereas the second one has a low 
marginal cost and a high fixed cost. In this case, it is efficient to allocate the good to 
the first wildcatter if there is little oil and to the second one if there is much oil. Thus, 
the single crossing condition will fail if the amount of oil is exclusive information of the 
first wildcatter.
We argue in the paper that a similar argument applies with some generality to 
auctions with a (potentially) inefficient incumbent and some fixed costs. We also argue 
that the single crossing condition may fail naturally in the one-dimensional reduced 
form of models with multi-dimensional types. In particular, this may happen when the 
multidimensional type contains information about common and private components of 
the value and/or about an allocative externality.
We provide two types of results. First, we characterize the second best allocation 
when the single crossing condition fails. This allocation is not trivial, in fact, we show 
that it may be second best efficient to not allocate the good with positive probability 
even when it is first best to always allocate the good. Regretfully, our characterization 
is not complete in this last case.
Second, we analyse whether the second best can be implemented as the equilibrium 
of an English auction. We start noting a negative result when the second best allocation 
implies no selling, even if we allow for reserve prices or entry fees. Thus, we add the 
constraint that the good is always sold. In this case, we can always find an equilib­
rium that implements the second best. However, the existence of this equilibrium when 
there are three or more bidders seems to be a consequence of the usual multiplicity of 
equilibria in English auctions. To illustrate the non-robustness of this equilibrium, we 
study the case in which the single crossing condition fails for one bidder with a weakly 
dominant strategy. We show that the second best allocation cannot be implemented in 
an equilibrium in which this bidder uses her weakly dominant strategy.2 This is because 
the information that this bidder quits may induce a “rush” with positive probability, i.e. 
all the remaining bidders may quit simultaneously. We find that a two-stage English 
auction may solve this problem.
The most closely related papers are those we have already quoted by Maskin (1992), 
Maskin (2000), Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001). Krishna 
and Perry (1998) and Williams (1999) also characterize conditions for efficient Bayesian
2We do not include the formal proof as we are currently revising this part of our work. The same is 
true for the remark on the two-stage English auction made below.
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implementation3 with independent types.
Independence of types is probably a not very realistic assumption when there is a 
common value component in bidders’ uncertainty and two or more bidders have private 
information about it. Note, however, that when we withdraw this assumption, the 
results of Cremer and McLean (1985) imply that the efficient allocation can be Bayesian 
implemented in general.4 But, the mechanism requires arbitrarily large payments that 
seem unrealistic. More recently, McLean and Postlewaite (2004) have shown that this 
critic does not apply when agents are “informationally small” . However, we expect 
agents to be “informationally small” in general only when they are sufficiently many.
From a different perspective, Mezzetti (2004) has shown that Bayesian implemen­
tation of the efficient outcome can always be achieved in a two-stage mechanism if 
the mechanism can condition on the realized outcome-payoffs. However, as Jehiel and 
Moldovanu (2003) (the design of a private industry) have already pointed out Mezzetti’s 
mechanism displays no incentives to reveal truthfully in the second stage, and requires 
that payments are made when all information is available which makes it sensitive to 
renegotiation and moral hazard.
Some of the above papers, in particular Maskin (1992), Maskin (2000), Dasgupta 
and Maskin (2000), and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001), have also studied the set of im- 
plementable allocations when bidders have multidimensional private information. They 
show that an implementable allocation cannot depend on the type beyond a particular 
one-dimensional reduction. In general, the efficient allocation does not correspond to 
this one-dimensional reduction and thus it is not implementable. They, however, note 
that we can always define a constrained efficient allocation that maximizes expected 
social surplus subject to the one-dimensional reduction.
Although our second-best analysis is in principle unrelated to the problem described 
in the previous paragraph because we assume a one-dimensional type space, we note 
that our results may be useful in the efficiency analysis based on the one-dimensional 
reduced types. The reason is that there are no a priori arguments that ensure that the 
one-dimensional reduction satisfy the single crossing condition and thus the constrained 
efficient allocation may not be implementable.
Finally, we want to note another branch of the literature that has looked at the 
implementation of the efficient allocation through realistic auction formats, and in par­
3We discuss the literature on ex post implementation in the Conclusions.
4Neeman (2004) and Heifetz and Neeman (2006) also cast some doubts on the genericity of these 
results.
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ticular for single unit sales through an English auction. Maskin (1992), Krishna (2003), 
Birulin and Izmalkov (2003) give necessary and sufficient conditions and note an im­
portant difference between two bidders and more than two bidders: in the former case 
the single crossing condition plus a natural non-decreasing condition are necessary and 
sufficient, whereas the latter case requires more restrictive conditions.5 We also show 
that there is a difference between these two cases but because of a different reason. In 
fact, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the English auction to implement the 
efficient allocation are the same under our assumptions for any number of bidders.
On the technical side, our work is related to Myerson (1981). We use the techniques 
he used to characterize the revenue maximizing mechanism in the non-regular case, 
what he calls ironing technique, to find the allocation that maximizes the expected 
social surplus.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the formal model. 
Sections 3 defines the First Best allocation. Section 4 introduces some motivating ex­
amples where the First Best cannot be achieved. Section 5 contains the characterization 
of the Second Best efficient allocation. Section 6 shows when the English Auction can 
be effectively employed to implement the Second Best efficient allocation, discussing the 
robustness of the result both for the two bidders’ case and the generic n bidders’ case. 
Section 7 deals with the one dimensional reduction of multidimensional type models. 
Section 8 concludes.
4.2 The M odel
One unit of an indivisible good is put up for sale to a set N  of n bidders. Let s = 
( s i , ..., sn) G l n be a vector where S{ corresponds to the realization of an independent 
random variable with distribution Fi with strictly positive density in all the support 
Si C R. Bidder i G N  observes privately s* and gets a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
Vi(s) — p if she gets the good for sale at price p, and gets utility —ej(sj) — p if bidder 
j , j  ^  i, gets the good and i pays a price p. Thus, ej denotes a negative externality6 
produced by j  on each of the other bidders. To make the analysis simpler, we assume 
that the seller neither derives utility from getting the good nor suffers any externality.
We assume additive separability of the bidders’ value functions plus a symmetry 
assumption on the common value component. Formally, Vi(s) =  ti(si) +  YlieN Qj(sj) f°r
5Other papers that address this question are Izmalkov (2003), Dubra (2006), and Echenique and 
Manelli (2007).
6Note that we also allow for ej( sj) <  0 and thus for positive externalities.
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any i € N , where U(si) (t% stands for taste) is the private value and Eiew  Qj(sj) (<Zj 
stands for quality) is the common value. We also assume that vi(s) — (n — l)ej(si) > 0 
Vs and that Vi(s) is a strictly increasing function of s*, i.e. that fa(si) =  U(si) +  qi(si) is 
strictly increasing. Finally, we assume that hi(sj) =  U(si) — (n — l)ei(si) is measurable 
and at any point either right-continuous or left-continuous.
Our additive separability assumptions are restrictive. We can interpret them as 
first order approximations. The independency assumption may sound unrealistic for a 
model with common values. Note, however, that this critic only applies when two or 
more players have private information about the common value whereas this is not the 
case in two of our motivating examples, see Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. Moreover, there 
are other real life examples in which the independency assumption is reasonable, see 
Bergemann and Valimaki (2002). Finally, that fa is an increasing function is without 
loss of generality since we can always reorder the set Si to satisfy this assumption. 
However, the fact that fa is strictly increasing is restrictive. Typically, we would expect 
this assumption to be violated when the original type space was multidimensional, see 
Footnote 9. The analysis of this case is done in Section 4.7.
4.3 First B est Efficiency
We call an allocation to a measurable function p : S  —> [0, l]n, where S  =  fELi such 
that < 1 for any s G S. We are interested in the set of allocations that
can be implemented in an auction mechanism. By the revelation principle, there is no 
loss of generality in restricting to direct mechanisms. A direct mechanism is a pair of 
measurable functions (p, x ) where p is an allocation and x  : S —>n a payment function. 
In the direct mechanism (p,x), each bidder announces a type, and Pi(s) denotes the 
probability that i gets the good and Xi(s) her transfers to the auctioneer when the 
vector of announced types is s E S.
The expected utility of bidder i with type Si that reports s[ when all the other bidders 
report truthfully is equal to:
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where7
Q i(4 ,p )=  p ^ s - i )  f- id s -i ,
JS-i
and,
where S-i  =  U j&  s j  and /-*(«-*) =  E lj& f j ( sj)-
Thus, we say that an allocation p : S  —> [0, l]n is feasible if there exists a direct 
mechanism (p, x) that satisfies the following Bayesian incentive compatibility constraint:
&i(si,8i)=  sup {Ui(S i ,  s'i)},
for all Si £ Si and i £ N .
The following lemma characterizes the feasible allocation using a standard argument 
in mechanism design, see for instance Myerson (1981), Rochet (1985) and McAfee and 
McMillan (1988):
Lemma 4.1. An allocation p  is feasible if and only if Q i ( p , S i )  is weakly increasing in 
Si for all Si £ [0,1] and i £ N .
Proof We first prove the “only if”-part. Suppose a feasible allocation p. Then, there 
exists a direct mechanism {jp, x) for which:
Vi(si) =  Ui(si, Si) >  Ui(si, s'i)
= Qi(Si,p)(f>i(Si)-\-^i(Si,p,x)
= Qi(Si,P)M s'i) +  ^i(«i>p»*) +  Qi(s'i,p)((f)i(si) -  <f>i(Si))
=  Vi(s'i) + Qi(s-,p)(&(si) -  <f>i{s'i),
for all Si, s'i £ Si, i £ N . Hence, we have that for Si > s', Vi(si) > V*(s'), and hence,
o  u  v )  <  * ( « )  -
*’ M si) -  M sd  ’
and applying the same inequality with the roles of Sj and s[ interchanged,
V i(8 i) -V iWQi(si,p) >
7With some abuse of notation, we denote by Pi(si ,s-i)  and Pj(si,s~i) the function pi and Pj, re­
spectively, evaluated at a vector whose Z-th component is equal to the Z-th component of s_i if I < i, 
it is equal to Si if I =  i and it is equal to the I — 1-th component of s~i if I > i. We adopt the same 
convention for Xi(U,t-i).
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Thus, Qi(si,p) > Q»(sJ,p) as desired.
To prove the “i f ’-part, suppose an allocation p for which Qi{.,p) is increasing, for 
alii £ N . Note first that by assumption (j>i{.) is a strictly increasing function, and thus 
invertible in [&(()), &(1)]. Let Vi(y) = JJ.(0) Qi{4>~l (y),p)dy for y £ [<M0),<Ml)] and,
%i(s) =  Qi(Si,p)(f>i(Si)+
/  (Pi(sh 8~i)qj(Sj) -  ej(sj)pj(si, s - i)) f- i{ s - i)  ds-i -  V i(M si)), 
Js~* &
for any s £ S. This means that \Eq(si,p,:r) =  Vi(0*(si)) — Qi{si,p)<j>i(si), for any s* £ Si, 
and hence that Vi{4>i(si)) =  Ui(si,Si) for the direct mechanism (p, x). We shall show 
that this direct mechanism satisfies the Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints. To 
see why, note that for any s*, sj G Si
Ui(si,Si) = Vi((f>i(si))
= Qi(4>P)Msi) +  ^i(s'i,p ,x) +  Qi(s'i,p) ((f>i(Si) -  (f>i{s'i))
= Qi{s’i,p)(t>i(si) +  ^i(s-,p ,x)
Sj),
where the inequality is a consequence of Vi being a convex function and Qi(4>f1(y),p) £ 
dVi{y) by definition of Vi. □
We use the following natural definition:
Definition 4.1. We say that an allocation p is first best efficient when Pi(s) > 0 only
if:
Vi(s) -  (n -  l)ei(si) = max{uj(s) -  (n -  l)e j(sj)}j=1,
and Pj(s) = f or s £ S. This is equivalent to say that an allocation p is first
best efficient when Pi(s) > 0 only if:
hi(si) = ma^{hj(sj)}J=1,
and Pj{s) = 1, for all s £ S.
We adapt the following definition to our framework:8
8The single crossing condition is usually formulated with the following alternative condition:
yi(s) — (n — l)ei(si) > max{vj(s) — (n — 1 )ej(sj)}j7a
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Definition 4.2. We say that the single crossing condition is satisfied for bidder i if for 
any s, s' G S  such that s\ > Si and Sj = s'- for j  ^  i, it is verified that
Vi(s) -  (n -  l)ei(sj) > max{vj(s) -  (to -  1 )e j(s j)} j#
implies that
Vi(s') -  (n -  l)ej(sj) > max{vj(s') -  (n -  1 )ej (s,j )}jJLi .
Our additive separability assumptions allow for a condition simpler to check in ap­
plications. Note that it basically says that hi(.) must be an increasing function at any 
point at which its value may determine the first best efficient allocation.
Lemma 4.2. The single crossing condition for bidder i is satisfied if and only if for any 
Si,s^ G Si such that Si < s
hi(si) > hi(s'i) implies {s_i G S -i  : max{hj(sj)}j^i G (h^s'f), /ii(sj))} =  0.
Proof The definition of single crossing condition is equivalent to say that for any i G N, 
s G S  and s' G Si such that s'i > sf.
hi(si) > ma^{hj(sj)}j^i implies h^s'f) > m ax{hj(sj)}j^i. (4.1)
This is equivalent to say that for any i G N, s G S  and s' G Si such that a} >
/li(s') < max{hj(sj)}j^i implies hi(si) < m ax{hj(sj)}j^i. (4.2)
The above two conditions are equivalent to say that for any i G N , s G S  and s[ G Si 
such that s[>  sf.
hi(si) > m ax{hj(sj)}j^i > h^(s') implies hj(s-) > m sx{hj(sj)}j^i > hi(si). (4.3)
Since the consequence of the last condition cannot hold true, this last condition is 
equivalent to the condition in the lemma. □
implies that
Vi(s ) -  (n -  l)ei(s-) >  max{u,-(s') -  (n -  l)e ;(&;)};?*<>
for any s'i > Si and s' =  Sj for j  ^  i.
This alternative condition is sufficient for feasibility of the first best. If we a add differentiability, it 
also implies the single crossing condition of Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), the pairwise single crossing 
condition, the average crossing condition and the cyclical crossing condition of Krishna (2003) and the 
generalized single crossing condition of Birulin and Izmalkov (2003). We have used our alternative 
definition to get also a necessary condition.
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P roposition  4.1. A n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  b e s t  t o  b e  f e a s i b l e  i s  t h a t  t h e  s i n g l e  
c r o s s i n g  c o n d i t i o n  i s  s a t i s f i e d  f o r  a l l  b i d d e r s .  M o r e o v e r ,  t h i s  c o n d i t i o n  i s  a l s o  s u f f i c i e n t  
i f  t h e  s e t  {s* : h i ( s i )  =  k} h a s  z e r o  p r o b a b i l i t y  f o r  a n y  i  G N  a n d  k G M.
P r o o f .  In the proof let J i ( s i )  = {s_* : m a x { h j ( s j ) } j ^ i  < h i ( s i ) }  and J _ i { s i )  = {s_i : 
max{hj(sj)}j^i < hi(si)}. Note that for any efficient allocation p*, Qi{s{,p*) is weakly 
greater than the probability of Jj(si) and weakly higher than the probability of J i ( s i ) .
We start with the necessary part. We prove it by contradiction. Suppose that the 
single crossing condition does not hold. Then, by Lemma 4.2 there exists a bidder i  G N  
with types s[ > Si and a vector G S - i  such that m a x { h j ( s j ) } j^ i  G (hi(s^), hi(si)). By 
either right or left continuity of the h j ( . ) ’s, there exists an open set O C S - i  such that 
max{tj{Sj)}j^i G (U(s'i),ti(si)) for any s'^  G O. Thus, Ji(s{) D O = 0 and Ji(sJ) U O c  
Ji(si ). Thus, by the above arguments we have that Qi(s'i,p*) + p { 0 )  <  Qi{si ,p*) for 
any efficient allocation p* and where p { 0 )  denotes the probability of O. Since O  is open 
p { 0 )  0, which implies a violation of the feasibility conditions of Lemma 4.1.
For the sufficient part, note that the assumption that the set {si : hi(si) = k} has 
zero probability for any i  G N  and k G implies that for any first best efficient allocation 
p*, Qi(si,p*) is equal to the probability of both the set Ji(si) and the set J_i(si). Thus, 
the sufficient part follows since J_i(si) C by Lemma 4.2, and then the condition of
Lemma 4.1 is satisfied as desired. □
That a version of our single crossing condition is sufficient for feasibility of the first 
best is well known. The necessary part is a consequence of the additive structure of our 
model. Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) have also proved that a single crossing condition 
is necessary for a more demanding definition of feasibility of the first best.
4.4 Economic Applications
In this section, we provide some economic models in which the single crossing condition 
will typically fail. A setting that allows for generalizations of the following examples can 
be found in Section 4.7.
4.4.1 A n In cu m b en t’s M od el
We now formalizes the wildcatters’ example mentioned in the Introduction. Suppose the 
sale of a license to become a monopolist of a market with an inverse demand function
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P(Q) =  1 — 0. where s\ is equal to the realization of a random variable with distribution 
function F\ with a density on the support [s, s], 0 < s  < s.
We assume a set of firms N.  One of the firms, that we call the i n c u m b e n t  and denote 
by 1 (E TV, has a constant marginal cost ci, whereas each of the other firms, the e n t r a n t s ,  
has the same constant marginal cost c, c < c\ < 1. We also assume that the incumbent 
has zero setup costs and that each of the entrants i  has a setup cost —Si, which is equal 
to the realization of a random variable with an independent distribution Fi with density 
and support [— ,0]. The assumption on the support of S{ ensures that the entrants 
always find it profitable to buy the good at zero price, and that there is a set of types 
that value the license higher than any type of the incumbent. We assume that the value 
of each s* is private information to bidder i .
The above example correspond to: ti(s i) =  hi(si) = si  9i(si) =
s i (1~c) , ei(si) =  0, and tj(sj) = hj(sj) = Sj, qj(sj) = 0 and ej(sj) = 0, for j  ^  1. The 
single crossing condition is violated for bidder 1. To see why note that hi(s) > h\(s), 
h j ( - s ^~j- ) < hi(s) and h j(0) > h\(s), j  /  1. Hence, by continuity there exists an 
Sj £ ,0] such that hj(sj) 6 (hi(s),hi(s)). Thus, the single crossing condition
fails for bidder 1 by application of Lemma 4.2 to Si = s and = s, and i  = 1.
4.4 .2  A n  Insider’s M odel
In this example, we consider the sale of a good, say a painting, to some bidders whose 
value depends on their private taste and on the fact that the painting may be a copy 
or an original. We shall assume that only one of the bidders, t h e  i n s i d e r  (perhaps an 
expert dealer), knows whether the painting is original.
Formally, assume that the value of the good to each bidder is equal to the sum 
of a private value 7* and a common value p. Assume by now that each t* follows an 
independent and identical distribution G  with density in the support [ t , t \ .  Assume 
also that p takes value 0 (the painting is a copy) with probability a, and value q (the 
painting is original) with probability 1 —a. Suppose that each bidder observes privately 
her private value and that the insider, say bidder 1, also observes privately the common 
value.
For q +  t  > t ,  we can make this example fit into our assumptions.9 In particular,
9Note that in principle it is not direct how to fit the case q +  t < t in our model. The reason is that in 
this case there exists two possible types of bidder 1, say si and si, for which (t(si), q(si)) /  , q(s[))
and <f>i(s) =  which violates our assumption that <j>i must be strictly increasing. This case,
however, may be analyzed using the framework of Section 4.7.
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let si be drawn according to a distribution F \(si) =  aG (si) if si < q + 1 and i'i(s i) =  
a  +  (1 — a)G (si — q) otherwise, and let s*, i ^  1 be drawn according to G{.). Thus, we 
can make p =  0 and r =  si if si < q + 1 and p =  q and t  =  s\ — q otherwise. Then, the 
above example can be described in terms of our model by ti(si)  =  s\ and <?i(si) =  0 if 
si € %t) and ^i(s i) — si — q and qi(s\) = q if si G \g +  t , q -\-£]; and by U(si) = Si and 
Qi(U) =  0, for i 1. Moreover, ei(si) =  0 for any i and Sj.
It is easy to verify that the single crossing condition is violated for bidder 1. To see 
why, apply Lemma 4.2 to si = t  — e and =  t +  q +  e for e > 0 and small enough.
4.4.3 A  M odel w ith  N eg a tiv e  E xtern alities
Suppose n local markets, each with a unit mass of consumers with reservation value 1 for 
the consumption of the good. Suppose also n firms. Each firm starts with a branch in 
a local market. At the beginning, no two firms have a branch at the same local market. 
Firms can also open new branches at a fixed cost C < 1. Firms serve any local market 
in which they have a branch at a marginal cost c.
Suppose that a seller puts up for sale a technology that reduces the marginal costs 
of firm i  by an amount s*. Suppose that s* is drawn from an independent distribution 
Fi with support [0,1]. If only one firm serves a market, its profits are equal to 1 — c. 
When more than one firm serves a local market, we assume an outcome consistent with 
Bertrand competition: the firm with the lowest marginal cost serves the market at a 
price equal to the second lowest marginal cost. In case of more than one firm with the 
lowest marginal cost, we assume that they split equally the demand at a price equal to 
their common marginal cost. Thus, a firm finds it profitable to open a branch in each of 
the other markets only if she has won the technology and the reduction in the marginal 
cost is sufficiently large, in particular, if and only if Si > C.
Hence, in this model, for any i ,  ti(si) =  Si and ej(sj) =  0 if Si < C, and U(si) =  
Si +  (n — l)(sj — C) and ei(sj) =  1 — c, otherwise. Note also that qi(si) = 0 for any i  
and si. As consequence, hi(si) = Si for Si < C  and hi(si) = Si — (n — 1)(C +  1 — c — Si), 
otherwise. In this case, the single crossing condition is violated for any bidder. To see 
why, apply Lemma 4.2 to Si — C — e and Si = C +  e, and Sj G (C — e, C) for all j  /  i, 
and e > 0 and small enough.
4.5 Second B est Efficiency
In light of Proposition 4.1, it is natural to define second best efficiency.
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Definition 4.3. W e  s a y  t h a t  a n  a l l o c a t i o n  i s  s e c o n d  b e s t  e f f i c i e n t  i f  i t  m a x i m i z e s
s u b j e c t  t o  p  f e a s i b l e .
Certainly, the set of second best allocations includes the first best allocation when 
the single crossing condition is satisfied.
It also turns out to be useful to define the following concept.
Definition 4.4. W e  s a y  t h a t  a n  a l l o c a t i o n  i s  s e c o n d  b e s t  e f f i c i e n t  s u b j e c t  t o  a l w a y s  
s e l l i n g  i f  i t  m a x i m i z e s
i—1
s u b j e c t  t o  p  f e a s i b l e  a n d  Y 1 7 = i P i ( s )  =  1 f o r  a n y  s  ^
To simplify the notation in what follows, we shall assume without loss of generality
note that if F{ were not uniform, we could always re-scale the vector of signals §i = Fi(si)
first described by Myerson (1981). Let Hi(si) = JQS* hi(§i) dsi for alH G n and s* G [0,1], 
and let Gi(si) : [0,1] —> R be the convex hull of the function Hi (i.e. the highest convex 
function on [0,1] such that Gi(si) < Hi(si) for all si G [0,1].) Formally:
G i ( s i )  = min { w H i ( r i) +  (1 -  w ) H i { r 2 ) : w ,  n ,  r 2 G [0,1] and w r \  +  (1 -  w ) r 2 =  s*} .
Lemma 4.3. P r o p e r t i e s  o f  G { :
10Lehmann (1988) was the first one showing that there is no loss of generality in assuming that signals
have a uniform marginal distribution.
11To see why, note that the probability of {s* < z}  for 2  € [0,1] is equal to the probability of
{Fi(si) < z } which is equal to the probability of {s* < F f 1(z)} and thus, it is equal to Fi(F~1(z)) =  z.
L—l
s u b j e c t  t o  p  f e a s i b l e  a n d  Y a = i P i ( s ) =  1 f o r  a n y  s  €  A n  e q u i v a l e n t  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  
i s  t h a t  i t  m a x i m i z e s ,
that each Fi is uniform on [0, l].10 To see why this assumption is without loss of generality
and value functions fy(s) =  U(si) +  <2j(£j) and &j(sj) where tj(sj) =  ti(i^_1(si)),
qj{s j) = q j ( F f 1(sj)) and ej (s j )  =  e j ( F ~ l {s j) ) .  Note that each of the new signals s^’s 
has a uniform distribution on [0, l].11
To characterize the second best, we apply the “ironing technique” whose details were
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• Gi is convex.
• Gi(0) =  Hi(0) and G<(1) =  Hi{ 1).
• Gi{U) < Hi(ti) for all U G [0,1].
• If  Gi(ti) < Hiiti) in an open interval, then Gi is linear in the same open interval.
Proof. All the properties in the proposition follow from the application of standard 
mathematical arguments that we do not reproduce to the definition of convex hull. □
As a convex function Gi is differentiable except at countably many points, and its 
derivative is a non-decreasing function. We define gi : [0,1] —> to be the differential of 
Gi completed by right-continuity.
P roposition  4.2. An allocation p* such that Pi(s) = f or a^  s> second best
efficient subject to always selling i f 'i i  G N :
(i) pj(s) > 0 only if gi(si) = max{gj(sj)}jGN a.e.;
(ii) Qi{.,p*) is constant in any open interval in which gi{.) is constant.12
Moreover, if maxi^N 9i(si) +  — 0 f or anV s *= ^ien P* a s^o second
best efficient.
Proof. The second best maximizes:
P n p n I n \
/  ^ ( ^ w - (n _ 1 )ei(s) ) ^ ( s) d s =  /  X ! ( I pt W^ s -  (4-4) 
i=1 JS i=1 \  j =1 J
Next note that using integration by parts we can show that,
/  (hi(si) -  gi(si))pi(s)ds = /  (hi(si) -  gi(si)) Qi(sifp) dsi =
J s  JSi
[(#*(«») -  G?i(«t))Q»(s*,P)]J;=o “  f  -  Gi{si)) Qi(dSi,p) =
J Si
~ [  (Hi(si) -  Gi(si)) Qi{dsi,p), (4.5) 
JSi
where the last step follows from item 2 of Lemma 4.3.
12There always exists an allocation that satisfies both properties. For instance, pi(t) =  0 if gi(U) ^  
maXj£N9j(tj), and otherwise, pi(t) =  ^ j ,  where m(t) denotes the cardinality of {k G N  : gk(tk) =  
maxj^N gj(tj)}.  The monotonicity of g%{U) ensures that the allocation is feasible.
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Consequently, we can write Equation (4.4) as,
P n /  n \  n -
/  ( 9 i ] PiM  ds + ^ 2  ~ Hi(si)) Qi(dSi,p). (4.6)
ds i=i y  j =l j  i=1 JSi
Thus, if p* satisfies (i), it maximizes the first integral among all the allocations p 
for which Pi(s) = 1 f°r all s. Similarly, if p* satisfies (i) and m a gi{si) +  
2 j= i  Qj(sj) — 0) P* maximizes the first integral among all allocations. Next, note 
that the second integral is non-positive since Qi{.,p) is increasing for any p feasible by 
Lemma 4.1, and Gi(si) < Hi(si), by item 3 of Lemma 4.3. Moreover, note that this 
second integral is equal to zero for any p that satisfies (ii). This is because item 4 of 
Lemma 4.3 implies that < (^.) is constant, and so Qi(-,p), in any open interval in which 
Gi(si) < Hi(si). Consequently, an allocation p* that satisfies (ii) maximizes the second 
integral. □
However, if max^N 9i{si) +  Y2j=iQj(sj) < 0 in an open interval, the second best 
allocation may imply that the good is unsold for some bidders’ types. To see why note 
the following example:
Example 4.1. N  = {1,2}, Vi(s) =  s* +  2Sj and ei(si) =  0 for i , j  G {1,2} and i ^  j .
Proposition 4.3. Any second best allocation of Example 1 satisfies pi(s) +  P2 (s) =  0 
for s\ +  S2  < 1/4 a.e.
Proof For our example, hi(si) =  — Si, Hi(si) =  — and thus, Gi(si) = — ^  and
1
2 ‘9i{si) = Hence, the corresponding Equation (4.6) to Example 1 is:
[  Y  ( - ^  +  2si +  2s2)  Pi(s)ds+ Y  [  ( “ TT + Qi(dsup). (4.7)
«'[°>1]2 i=\2  '  '  i= l,2 '  '
The first integral is maximized by any allocation that satisfies a.e. p i(s i ,s 2) +  
P2 (s i ,s2) = 0 if si +  «2 < 1/4, and p i(s i ,s2) + P2 {si,s2) =  1 otherwise, whereas the 
second integral is maximized by any allocation such that Qi(.,p), i = 1,2, is constant.
An example of an allocation that satisfies these two conditions is the following:13
• pi(s) = p2(s) = 0 if si +  s2 < 1/4.
• Pi(s) =  m  +  and p2{t) =  1 -  pi(s), if si > 1/4, s2 < 1/4.
13Regretfully, we cannot always find the maximum of Equation (4.6) by maximizing both integrals 
simultaneously and thus a more complex analysis is required. We illustrate this claim in the appendix 
with a symmetric and an asymmetric example.
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•  pi(s) =  1 -  ( g  +  §si) and ^ ( s )  = 1 -  p i(si, s2), if s 2 > 1/4, si < 1/4.
• P i(s) — P2 {s) = 1/2 otherwise.
Note that Q i(si) = Q 2 ( s 2 ) =  for any s i , s 2 G [0,1]. □
To get a superficial intuition of the result note that in the example it is efficient 
to allocate the good to bidder 2 when her signal is low and bidder l ’s signal is high. 
Similarly, it is efficient to allocate the good to Bidder 1 when her signal is low and bidder 
2’s signal is high. However, this allocation is difficult to implement because both bidders 
have very little incentives to report truthfully when their signal is high. They know that 
by reporting a high signal they increase the probability that the good goes to the other 
bidder. Thus, no selling if both bidders report low makes it easier to induce truth-telling 
when signals are high. Moreover, the cost in terms of social surplus is small since the 
value of both bidders is close to zero when both signals are low.
Finally, it is interesting to remark that if there exists a bidder for which gi = hi, 
the condition in Proposition 4.2 that ensures that it is second best efficient to always 
sell is always verified. To see why, note that g i  =  h i  implies that g i { s i )  +  Q j( s j )  — 
hi(s{) +  Q j ( s j )  which is equal to Vi(s) — ( n  — l)ei(sj) and thus non-negative.14 It 
is easy to see that h i  =  g i  for i  /  1 in the examples in Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. More 
generally, this condition is verified by any example in which no more than one bidder has 
private information about the common value and/or induces an allocative externality 
on the other bidders.
4.6 English Auction
In this section we analyze whether the second best can be implemented with an English 
auction. In particular, we assume the model of the English auction described by Krishna 
(2003). This auction model is a variation of the Japanese auction proposed by Milgrom 
and Weber (1982) in which the identity of the bidders is observable.
We introduce two additional assumptions. The first one is a simplification, we assume 
that the functions h ^ s  are continuous. This assumption also implies:
Lemma 4.4. T h e  f u n c t i o n s  g i ’s  a r e  c o n t i n u o u s .  M o r e o v e r :
•  9 i ( s i )  =  h i ( s i )  i f  G i ( s i )  =  H i ( s i )  a n d  Si G (0,1).
14Recall that by assumption Vi(s) — (n — l)ei(si) >  0.
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• 9i(0) < hi(0) with strict inequality only if Gi(e) < Hi(e) for any e > 0 small 
enough.
• 9i{ 1) > h{( 1) with strict inequality only if Gi{ 1 —e) < Hi(l — e) for any e > 0 small 
enough.
Proof. The function gi cannot be discontinuous at points in an open interval in which 
Gi(si) = Hi(si) by continuity of hi, or at points in an open interval in which Gi(si) ^  
Hi(s i) by item 4 of Lemma 4.3. Take now a point s* G (0,1) in which to the left 
Hi(si) = Gi(si) and to the right Hi(si) > Gi(si) (the other case is symmetric). Then 
the left derivative of Gi is equal to hi(s*) and the right derivative is bounded above 
by hi(s*). Moreover, by the convexity of Gi the left derivative of Gi must be less than 
or equal to the right derivative. As a consequence, Gi is differentiable at s* and its 
differential gi(s*) is equal to hi(s*). Continuity at 0 and 1 together with the last two 
items of the lemma are direct consequences of items 2 and 3 in Lemma 4.3 and the 
boundedness of hi. □
The other assumption is that Ci(si) = 4i(si) +  ei(si) is non-decreasing. This as­
sumption ensures that our proposed bidding functions are increasing. This assumption 
translates to our set-up a similar assumption used in the study of first best efficiency 
in English auctions, Maskin (2000), Krishna (2003) and Birulin and Izmalkov (2003), 
and that basically requires that the bidders’ values are non-decreasing functions of the 
bidders’ types.
We start remarking that in general there is very little hope that the English auction 
can implement the second best when it implies no selling. To see why, recall that in 
Example 1, second best requires no selling if si +  S2 < 1/4. However, an English auction 
with an entry fee and/or a reserve price can only ensure no selling for sets of types 
{(si, S2) G [0, l]2 : si,S 2  > s} for some s G [0,1], A more general analysis of this 
question remains open.
We shall see that our conclusions depend on whether the number of bidders is equal 
to two or it is larger than two. We start with the former case.
4.6.1 T he T w o-B idder C ase
Suppose in this subsection that n = 2. We shall show that in this case, the English 
auction implements the second best efficient allocation. To prove so, we follow three 
steps. First, we propose a bid function for each bidder; second, we prove that they
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allocate the good according to the second best allocation; and finally, we show that they 
are an equilibrium of the English auction.
We start with some auxiliary definitions. Let : [0,1] —> [0,1], i ^  j,  be such 
that sj(sj) and sj (sj) are equal to the minimum and maximum s*, respectively, that 
solve gi(si) = gj{sj), if gi(si) £ b j( 0 ),pj(l)], this is when our equation has a solution.
In case the equation has no solution, we let sj(sj) and sj(sj) be both equal to zero if
gj(sj) < gi(0 ) and equal to one if gj(s j ) > SiM-
Let b*(si) =  vf(si,s£(si)), and fr-jM =  vf(s?(s2 ), S2) where vf(si,Sj) = Vi(si,Sj) +  
ej(sj) (this is vf (si, Sj) = 4>i(si) +  Cj{sj))- Thus, we propose that bidder 1 (respectively 
bidder 2 ) bids her maximum willingness to pay to obtain the object when the alternative 
is that the good goes to the other bidder conditional on the hypothetical event that the 
signal of the other bidder is equal to s ^ s i)  (respectively sf(s2).) To understand the 
intuitive meaning of this hypothetical event note first the following auxiliary result:
Lemma 4.5.
• b$(si) > 6 2 (^2) if and only if gi(si) > £2 (5 2)-
• 6J(si) < 6£(s 2) if and only if gi(si) < g2 {s2).
Proof. We only prove the first item. The second one is simply the negation of the first 
one.
We first show the “if” part. Consider first the case <7i(0 ) > #2 (1 )- By monotonicity 
of the bid functions, we only need to show that g\ (0) > <72(1 ) implies that 61 (0 ) > 6 2 (1 ). 
Note that it is easy to see that 61 (0 ) — 6 2(1 ) =  0 i(O) — Ci(0) +  (<Wl) — C2 (l)) =  6.1 (0 ) — 
h2{l), which is greater than <7i(0 ) — <72(1 ) by Lemma 4.4, and thus non-negative as 
desired. Consider now the case <71 (0) < g2(l). In this case, <71 (si) > g2(s2) implies that 
there exists < si and S2 ^  s 2  such that p i ^ )  =  g2 {s2), si =  sf(sy  and s'2 = sJW)* 
Thus:
b*i(si) ~ bl{s2) > 6 j ( « i ) -  b*2(s'2) =
[ M s'l) -  Cl(s?(s'2))] -  [ M s2) -  C2(»2(*i))] =
[< M s?(s '2)) -Cl(Si(s'2))] -  [< 2^(»2(«i)) -  C2(s2(si))] =
hlUi(s2)) ~  ^2 («2 («l)),
which by application of Lemma 4.4 and the definition of sf and Srj is weakly greater 
than <7i(sf(si)) — g2(s^si)). This last expression is equal to zero as a consequence of 
the properties that define si and S2 .
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We prove the “only i f ’ part by contradiction. We shall show that <72(^2) > 9i{si) 
implies that 6 2 (^2 ) > bi(si). The proof is similar to the “if” part. The case <72(0 ) > 9 i W  
is symmetric to the case <7i(0 ) > <72(1 ) above. In the case <72(0 ) < <7i(l), 9 2 (^2 ) > 9 i{si) 
implies that there exists a decreasing sequence {s2,m} starting at S2 and an increasing 
sequence {si,m} starting at si with respectively limits s'2 and that satisfy <72(^2) =  
9i(s'i), s2 — s^s'i) and s[ = sf(s^). Note that along the sequence <72(52 ,771) > gi(si,m) 
and hence, S2 ,m >  S2 (s i,m) and s i)Tn < sf(s2,m)- Using these properties and the mono­
tonicity of the bid functions we have that:
2^ (^2 ) -  bl(si) > lim [6 3(5 2 ,m) -  &l(s l,m)] =to—► 00
lim [(<£2 (s2,m) -  C2(s2{si,m))) ~  (M sl,m) ~  C iU i^ to )))] =
TO—» OO
Hm [(6-2 (s2,to) “I" £2 (^2,771) — C2 (s2 (s1,tm))) — (hl(si,7n) +  Cl(^l,m) — Ci(^i(s2,to)))] ^to—► 00
lim [6-2 (5 2 77i) -  6 1 (51777)] =  6 2 (s2 (5 i)) -  hi(sj(s2)),
TO—► OO
which by the same arguments as in the ”if” part is non-negative as desired. □
Thus, 6 3 (5 2 ) G (6*(5i — e), 6*(si +  e)] for e > 0 is equivalent to S2 G (^ (s i — e), sf(5 i +  
e)], and consequently, the hypothetical event on which bidder 1 conditions to compute 
her bid is the limit of 6 3 (5 2) G (6*(si — e), 6* (51  +  e)] when e goes to zero.
Since both bid functions 6* and 63 are strictly increasing ties happen with zero prob­
ability. Thus, Lemma 4.5 implies that both conditions in Proposition 4.2 are satisfied 
and as a consequence:
C orollary 4.1. The allocation induced by (6*, 63) is second best efficient conditional on 
always selling.
Finally, next proposition shows that the proposed bid functions are in fact an equi­
librium:
P roposition  4.4. The bid functions (6*, 6 3) characterise a Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
of the English auction.
Proof. We only show that Bidder 1 finds it optimal to bid according to 6* when Bidder 
2 plays 6 3 . The corresponding proof for Bidder 2 is symmetric. Let ?q(si, 6) be the 
expected utility of Bidder 1 when she has a private type si, submits a bid 6 , and Bidder 
2 uses the bid function 6 3 . We only show that Bidder 1 does not have incentives to 
deviate downwards, i.e. Ui(si,b*(si)) — iii(s i,6) > 0 for 6 < 6 |(s i). The analysis of 
incentives to deviate upwards, i.e. 6 > 6*(si), is symmetric. Downward deviations
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only affect payoffs when Bidder 1 wins with b*(si) and loses with b. If we ignore ties, 
this happens when 6 2 (^2 ) £ (b, 6*(si)]. In this case, if Bidder 1 wins, she gets a good 
with value v\(si, s2) and pays Bidder 2’s bid and if bidder 1 loses she suffers a negative 
externality equal to 6 2 (5 2 )- Thus, the change in utility when bidder 1 wins is equal 
to v f(si,s2) -  uf(5 2 ,s?(s2)) =  <Msi) +  C2 (5 2) -  h M  ~ C i i d M -  By Lemma 4.5, 
£>2 (5 2) — ^i(s i) equivalent to <72(5 2) < 0i(s i)> and thus to 52 < s^ s i) , and s\ > sf(s2 ). 
Let t 2(6) be the infimum of {s2 £ [0,1] : &2(s2) > b} if it exists, and zero otherwise. 
Then:
«i(si,6I(si)) - u i ( s i ,b )  =
L
l ( s l)  +  C2(«2) -  <^2(52) -  Cl(£1(52))) dS2 =
r2(b) 
rs\(si)
/  [01 (« l) -  C l f e lM ) ]  -  [02(52) “  C2(»2)] dS2 >
J t< " '’T2 (b)
[  [0 lU l(s2 ) )  -  C lfei(s2))] -  [0 2 (^2) -  C2(«2)] ds2 =
Jr2{b)
•4(si)
[  [hi(si(s2)) -  h2(s2)] ds2 >
Jr2(b)
(0 2 (5 2 ) -  h2(s2)) ds2
fr2(b)L
where we have used that 0 i is strictly increasing and si > sf(s2) in the first inequality 
and that hi(s^(s2)) > 02(52), by Lemma 4.4 and the definition of sf, in the second 
inequality.
Finally, we argue that the last expression is non-negative. This integral is equal to
[ £ 2 (52 ( s i ))  -  t f 2 ( ^ ( s i ) ) ]  +  [H2(T2 (b)) -  G2(r2(b))].
The second difference is non-negative by the third item of Lemma 4.3. We next argue 
that the first one is equal to zero. If (si) is either zero or one, this is because of the 
second item of Lemma 4.3; otherwise, it is because ^ ( ^ ( s i ) )  < # 2 (5 2 (5 1 )) would imply 
that <72 is constant around s^ s i)  by item 4 of Lemma 4.3, which is a contradiction with 
the definition of s^ s i) . □
We can thus conclude from Corollary 4.1 and Proposition 4.4,
Corollary 4.2. The English auction implements the second best conditional on always 
selling when there are two bidders.
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A careful reader may worry that the above bid functions are identity dependent. 
We shall argue that in general this is not a problem. First, let Ki = {k G: 3(s, s) /  
0, gi(si) =  fc, Vs* G (s, s)} and note the following lemma:
Lem m a 4.6. I f  K \  fl K 2  =  0, then s* (si) =  Sj(si) almost everywhere.
Proof. Since any increasing function can be discontinuous in at most countably many 
points, it is sufficient to show that s*- is discontinuous at any point Sj G [0,1] for which 
# • )  < *}(«)■ First, note that gj is constant and equal to gi(si) in (sj(sj),5j(sj)) by 
definition of s*- and sj. Since K \  fl K 2  = 0, this means that gi is not constant at Si but 
strictly increasing. Hence, Sj(si — e) < +  e) for e > 0 and small. We can, thus,
deduce that 4 (« i) <  35 (® i) implies that sj is discontinuous at s*. □
Since asymmetries only arise when s*-(si) ^S j(s i) ,  asymmetries only occur in a zero 
measure set of types, and thus, could be removed without upsetting the equilibrium, 
when K\  fl K 2  = 0. But, we expect K \  fl K 2  = 0 to hold generically since the sets K^s  
are countable. 15
Note, however, that the symmetric model, i.e. when fa = fa, and £i =  £2 * is not 
generic but deserves special interest and verifies that K 1 OK2  ^  0- Moreover, if the single 
crossing condition fails, the symmetric equilibrium is not second best efficient subject to 
always selling. To see why recall Example 1 and note that its symmetric equilibrium is 
characterised by the bid function b(si) =  3sj. Thus, the bidder with higher type wins. 
However, this allocation is precisely the one that minimizes the expected value of the 
winning bidder, at least among the allocations that always allocate the good to one of 
the bidders. It is easy to see that our proposed second best equilibrium in this example 
is characterised by &i(si) =  si +  2  and 6 2 (^2 ) =  ^2 .
As we shall show next by means of an example, even when K \  fl K 2  = 0 the prob­
lems of multiplicity of equilibria in the English auction are more severe when the single 
crossing condition fails than when it holds:
Exam ple 4.2. N  = {1,2}, vi(si, S2 ) =  si +  2 ^ 2  and wa(si, S2) =  $2 +  2si +  .1.
In the above example hi(s\) =  —si and h2 {s2 ) =  —S2 +  -1. Thus, <71 (si) = —\  and
<72(^2) =  — and consequently, the second best allocation is to give the good to Bidder
2 for any realization of the bidders’ types. However, it is easy to see that the following
15 A simple argument is as follows. Let ^_1(A:) =  min{si G [0,1] : gi(si) =  k}. It is easy to see that if gi 
is constant and equal to k in an open interval, then the function g~l is discontinuous at k by definition. 
Finally, note Note that the set of the discontinuities of g r 1 must be countable since g^1 is increasing.
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strategies constitute an equilibrium: bi(s\) = s\ +  2 and 6 2 (^2 ) =  S2  +  .1. Moreover, we 
are not able to find an iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies that elimi­
nates neither this equilibrium nor the one we have proposed for implementation of the 
second best. Thus we do not expect that the refinement used by Chung and Ely (2001) 
to get uniqueness works when the single crossing condition fails.
We would like to conclude the section with a positive result regarding the imple­
mentation of the second best when there are only two bidders. Suppose that one of the 
two bidders’ valuations (say the one of bidder i) depends only on his own signal (i.e. 
Cj(sj) = 0). Then any equilibrium in non-weakly dominated strategies implements the 
second best. In any such equilibrium bidder i is active up to his value. It can be shown 
that any strategy that leads bidder j  to win for a set of type different from the one 
prescribed by the second best yields strictly less profits for bidder j . 16
4.6.2 T h e case n  >  2
We follow the same steps as in the previous section to prove that there exists an equi­
librium of the English auction that implements the second best.
Let,
f si _  /*3(si) _  /*{(*<)
9i(si) = gi(si) +  / l{g'(gi)=o} dSi +  2 ^ / dsi + 2 ^  / 1{^(sJ)=o} d i^-
J o  l < i  J o  l > i  J o
The function gi(si) is constructed to ensure that (i) #(««) > 0  for all Si G [0,1] and 
that (ii) gi(si) > gj(sj) implies that gi(si) > gj(sj) for all i , j  G N, and Sj, Sj G [0,1].
Denote by m < n the number of active bidders, define the following strategies for 
e > 0  small enough: 17
• If m > 2, then b*,m(si) =  egi{si), for all i G [0,1] and si G [0,1].
• If m = 2, then b*,2(si\{(k,pk)}) = Vi(s), where {(&,pfc)} is the set identities and 
prices at which the other bidders have quit, and s Gn is a vector whose i-th 
component is equal to S i , whose j-th  component, where j  is the identity of the 
other active bidder, is equal to s? (Si) if i > j  and to s? (Si) if i < j , and whose k-th,
k 7^  i , j  component is equal to <7^ HlW 6), where pk is the price at which bidder k
quit.
16We are currently formalizing the proof of this fact.
17If e is small enough, our proposed strategies are strictly monotone. Otherwise, it could happen that 
bi'3(si) > b*'2(si\b-i,j) for some values.
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We next provide an auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 4.7. For any i >  j  and s i ,  S j  E  [0,1],
• b*,m(si) > b*’m(sj) if and only if gi(si) > 9 j{sj), for m >  2.
• b*,m(si) < b*,m(sj) if and only if gi{si) < gj{sj), for m >  2.
• b*,2(si\b-ij) > b*j,2(sj\b-ij) if and only if gifa) > gj(sj).
® (si\b—jj j ^  bj 5^j16— j and onlsy (Si) < gj{Sj).
Proof. The first two items are a direct consequence of the definition of g\. The third
item, and thus the fourth which is its negation, have the same proof as Lemma 4.5.
Simply note that for i > j ,
b f M b - i j )  -  I f M b - i j )  =
*(«o+ +  E udbrrHh)) - - GGrffo)) - E «(Wm]_l(W) =
k^i,j k^i,j
□
Again, since the bid functions are strictly increasing ties happen with probability 
zero and thus Lemma 4.7 implies that both conditions in Proposition 4.2 are satisfied 
and as a consequence:
Corollary 4.3. The allocation induced by {b*,m} is second best efficient.
Finally, we show that our proposed strategies constitute an equilibrium.
P roposition  4.5. The strategies {b*,m}i^i and {b*,2}iei constitute a Perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium of the English auction.
Proof. We shall assume that all the bidders but one, Bidder i, follow the proposed 
strategies. For any vector of bidders’ types, let j  be the bidder whose type Sj is such 
that gj(sj) =  maxfc^j{pfc(sfc)}, i.e. is highest among the other bidders’ types re-scaled by 
the functions gi. We denote this vector by S-ij .  We shall show that Bidder i does not 
have incentives to deviate in the more stringent case in which she observes the vector of 
bidders’ types but Bidder f  s.
Let ui(si, Sj, b, S -ij )  be the expected utility of Bidder i with type s*, when she quits 
at price b, the other bidders follow the proposed bid functions and S-ij  is the vector of all
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the other bidders’ types but Bidder j .  Assume in what follows that i > j  and consider 
only downward deviations. The other cases have a symmetric analysis. Downward 
deviations axe payoff relevant conditional on s_ y  if the proposed strategy implies that 
Bidder i remains active after all bidders k ^  j  have quit. In this case, if Bidder i wins 
she gets a good that she values:
Qk(Sk)-
keN
and pays a price equal to Bidder f  s bid, which when all the other bidders follow the 
proposed strategy is equal to:
t j ( s j )  +  q i ( d ( s j ) )  +  J 2 q k ( s k ) +  C i ( d ( * j ) ) -
k^i
Whereas if i loses, she gets utility —ej(sj).
Thus, the difference in utility between winning and losing is equal to <j>i(si) — Q(sj (sj) 
[(p(sj) — C(sj)]- The remaining steps are similar to the proof of Proposition 4.4 where 
the only difference is that we use,
Sj < Tj(b*’2(si)) &  b*,2(sj\b-ij) < b*'2(si\b-itj) &  g^sj)  < # (* ) . (4.8)
which is a consequence of Lemma 4.7. □
C orollary 4.4. The English auction implements the second best when there are three or 
more bidders.
We argue that the generalization of the n =  2 equilibrium to the n > 2 case presented 
above does sometimes lead to equilibria that are based on weakly dominated strategies. 
A simple case of interest where this holds true is when one of the bidders’ values (say the 
one of bidder i) is independent of the other bidders’ signals (i.e (j ( s j )  =  0, for any j  /  i). 
Recall that we argued that under this condition all equilibria in non weakly dominated 
strategy implement the second best, when n = 2. To see what might go wrong with 
n > 2, suppose that bidder i plays her weakly dominant strategy to be active up to her 
value. Suppose also that the single crossing condition is violated for this bidder. This 
latter fact implies that some set of bidders j  ^  i would rather loose against bidder i if 
her signal is low and vice versa win if her signal is high. Thus, it can be the case that 
a set of bidders j  ^  i is active when conditional on winning they would make a loss. 
More precisely, they will be active whenever the expected profits of winning when i has 
a high value outweigh the expected losses of winning when bidder i quits ’’early”. The
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problem that might arise is that when bidder’s i drop-out value reveals that her signal 
is low all bidders want to quit simultaneously. The object is than allocated though some 
lottery.18 The allocation that results is typically inefficient and does not allow to respect 
the conditions for the second best stated in proposition 4.2.19
The above result questions the desirability of using the English auction to achieve 
an efficient outcome in the above setting. As a positive remark, we note that a two- 
stage English auction can be used to implement the second best and that its equilibrium 
survives the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. More precisely, we 
propose to run a first round in which all bidders other than i bid in an English auction. 
The winner of such auction is awarded the right to compete with i in the second stage.20
4.7 M ultidim ensional Type M odels
In this section we extend our analysis to a family of problems with a multidimensional 
type space. We shall show that under certain assumptions the analysis of these models 
can be done on an equivalent model with a one-dimensional type space. This analysis 
allows the extension of the models in Section 4.4.
Suppose that bidder i ’s private information is a three dimensional vector §i = 
(U,qi,ei) that it is drawn according to an independent distribution Fi with support 
in a bounded set Si C l 3. We shall assume that this distribution is such that the in­
duced distribution that generates U + Qh say Fi, has a strictly positive density /* in all 
the support Si C M. Denote by S  = n^=i and by S  = n iL i &i- We assume that 
bidder i gets utility U +  Y^j=i Qj ~ b if she wins and pays b, and utility — e,j — b if j  ^  i 
wins and bidder i pays b.
By the revelation principle, there is no loss of generality in restricting to direct 
mechanisms. A direct mechanism is a pair (p, x) where p : S  —> [0, l]n and x  : S  —► Rn 
such that 1 and where pi{s) denotes the probability that bidder i gets the
good and Xi(s) denotes the payments of i to the auctioneer when the announced vector 
of types is equal to s. We shall refer to p as an allocation*.
The expected utility of bidder i with type s* that reports s' when all the other bidders
18Ties in any ’’standard” English auction are resolved by some device that randomizes the allocation.
19We are currently formalizing the proof of such argument. We also have examples where equilibria
that are in non-weakly dominated strategies and implement the second best exist.
20The proof of this fact is under revision.
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report truthfully is equal to:
Sj) =  +  Qi) +
where
Qi(si,p) = j  S-i) dF—i(ds—i),
J s - i
and,
$*(«*, p,£) = / I pi(si,S- i)'S2qj -  Xi(8if s-i) -  Y]pj(si ,s-i)ej dF-i(ds-i),
V &  J
for F-i(s-i) = U m  Fj(sj) and S -i  = Uj& Sj.
Thus, we say that an allocation* p : S  —» [0, l]n is feasible* if there exists a direct 
mechanism (p, x) that satisfies the following Bayesian incentive compatibility constraint:
Ui(si,Si)=  supjC/^Si,^)}, 
sjes<
for all §i G Si and i G N.
We shall show that we can study second best efficiency in the model of this section, 
using the results in the model of Section 4.2:
D efinition 4.5. We call the uni-dimensional equivalent to a model as in Section 4-2 in 
which for all i G N  and Si G Si:
Si — Si, Fi(si) =  Fi{si),
+ f N f  s: M d*i) (  ^ [  - Fi(dsi) f   ^ Fi(dsi)ti{Si) =  / U - ,  qi{si) = qi -=—■ and e ^ )  = e* ,
J i W  JSi(8i) f i { S i )  JSi isi) /<(*<)
w/iere <Sj(si) =  {s* G 5* : U +  ® =  s j .
D efinition 4.6. We call the uni-dimensional version of an allocation* p to a function 
p : S  —► [0, l]n w/iere
Fn(dsn) Fi{dsi)
P i ( s )  = ... p(s)
JS^(S^) JSn(Sn)’ i si s  fn (sn) / l ( sl)
Lem m a 4.8. The allocation* p is feasible* if  and only if its uni-dimensional version p 
is feasible and Qi(si,p) G [Qi(U +  qi,p)~ , +  q u p ) + \ for any Si G Si and i G iV.21
21 We denote by Qi(xo,p)~ and Qi(xo,p)+ the limits
lim Qi(x,p) and lim Qi(x,p)
CC l (To  ^Xo
x < a?o x > xo
respectively. To avoid problems at the infimum and supremum of Si, we shall adopt the convention 
that Q*(inf Si,p)~ =  Qi (inf Si,p)  and Qi (supSi,p)+ =  Qi (supSi,p). We adopt the same notation and 
conventions for the functions Qi in the proof of the lemma.
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Proof. By definition of the uni-dimensional version p  and Lemma 4.1, the lemma is 
equivalent to the following statement:
The allocation* p  is feasible* if and only if there exists a vector of increasing 
functions Qi(x) ,  i G N ,  such that Q i{h ,P )  e [Qi{U +  ft)“ > Qi{U +  ft)+] for 
any Si G Si and i G N .
We prove the following equivalent statement, see Rockafellar (1970):
The allocation* p  is feasible* if and only if there exists a set o f increasing 
convex functions ft  : Si —> R + , i G N ,  such that Qi{s i ,p)  G dv(U  + qi) for 
any ft G Si and i G N .
We first prove the “only if”-part. Suppose a feasible* allocation* p  : S  —► [0, l]n, and 
let Vi(8i) =  Ui(si,Si). Then,
Vi(s») > Ui(si,s'i)
=  Qi(s^p)(U + qi) + Vi(si,P,x)
= Qi(si,p){ti + q'i) +  Vi(s'i,p,x) +  +  Qi ~ t'i -  $ )
=  y ^ s ’d  + Qi (sj, p ) (u + & - % - % ) ,
for all §i, ^  G Si, i G N ,  and some x  : S  —*■ Mn.
The above inequality applied twice, one with the roles of s* and s^  interchanged, 
to any two vectors Si, s' G Si such that U +  qi = +  q[, implies that Vi(si) =  Vi(s')-
Consequently, there exists a function Vi : Si —> R such that Vf(si) =  +  4i) for any
§i € Si. Moreover, Uj is convex because Vi is convex. Note that Vi must be convex because 
it is equal to the maximum of some linear functions by the incentive compatibility 
constraint. Finally, note that the above inequality together with the definition of Vi 
implies that Vi(y) > Vi(U +  qf) +  Qi(si,p)(y -  (U +  &)) for any y as desired.
To prove the “if”-part, suppose a function v  that satisfies the conditions of the lemma
for an allocation* p, and let x  : S  —> Rn be such that x) =  Vi(ti + ft) — (t* +
qi)Qi(s i ,p) for any i G N .  We shall show that the direct mechanism (p, x) satisfies the 
Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints. To see why, note that for any Si, s[ G Sf.
Vi(si) = Vi(U + ft) > Viit'i + q'i) + Qi(s'i ,p)(ti + ft -  t'i -  q[)
=  Qi{s'i,p)(i'i + %) + $<(«-,p, x) + Qi(s'i,p){ti + ft -  t'i -  q’i)
= Qi(Si ,p)( t i + ft) + Vi(s'i ,p,x) =  Ui(si, s'i),
where the inequality is a consequence of Qi(s'i,p) G d v { + q'i). □
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Now, we can state the main result of this section: 
P roposition  4.6. An allocation* p* is a solution to the problem,
max /  ^ 2  f ^  + % ~  (n ” ] Pi^  H d*)i
J s i=l  \  3=1 )
subject to p feasible* and ^2ieNpi{s) = 1 for all s G S, if and only if its uni-dimensional 
version p* is second best efficient subject to always selling for the uni-dimensional equiv­
alent model.
Proof. Take any p* feasible and such that =  1 for all s € S, and denote by p*
its one-dimensional version. Then we can deduce the lemma from the following sequence 
of algebraic transformations:
J§ ^+ ~ ft _ 1)®< j =
P n - n n
L  f t  “  f t  “  ^ i )  P i ( s )  F ( d § ) +  L  ^ P i i s )  ^ 2  % F ( dS) =
i = l  i=1 j = l
n p » n
^ 2  L  f t  “  (n “  1)®<) Q i& ’P) Fi(d§i) +  L ^2^3 F(ds) =
i= l ''Si 3=1
J 2  L  L  f t  “  f t  “  l )£i )  Q i ( s u p )  * ^ f S^ 7 i ( s i )  d *i +  Y 2  I  V  F ( d s)  =
i= \ J Si JSi(si) f  j = l
J2i  L ft ~(n~ VSi) Q i & i P )  i ( s i) d s i +  2^ f  V FAdh) =
i—\ J Si JSi(si) J i\Si) j __j J Sj
Y ,  f -  -  (n  -  1)e i(* i)) Q i ( s i , p ) f i ( s i )  d s i+ Y ^  f  L  Qi r r f j ( s3) ds i  =
Js j€S j  JSjtSj)
71 » Th n
J 2  / . f t  ft)  “ (n “ l)ei(si ))p{s)f(s)ds  + V  /_ qj(sj)~f j(sj) dsj =
S J s  f ^ J S j i s j )
n p n p n
Y 2  / . f t f t )  “  f t -  lf t(s i))p (s )/(s )d s  +  ^  I  Qj(sj ) Y ^ Pi^ 7 j ( sj ) ds3 =
i=1 j=l dSj(s j)  i=1
n p n p /  n \
^ 2  / - f t f t )  “  f t  -  l ) e i ( s i ) ) p ( s ) / ( s ) d s  + ^  _  J 2 v M  P i { s ) f { s ) d s  =
i=1 i= l \j i= l J
n p /  n \
^ 2  J ,  I ^ ft) + S ^ f t )  “ (n “  1)e^ft) ] P(s)7(s)ds,
*=i •/s  \ i=i
where we have used: in step 3, that Y7j=iP(s) =  1; in step 5, independency of the F f  s 
and that Qi(Si,p) =  Q i(s i , p )  a.e. by Lemma 10 and because Qi(s i ,p) is increasing and 
thus continuous a.e.; and in step 7, that Y7i=iPi(s) =  1- ^
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4.8 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied mechanisms that maximize the expected social surplus 
deriving from the sale of a (single-unit) object subject to Bayesian incentive compatibility 
constraints. An alternative approach for future research is the equivalent analysis under 
ex post incentive compatible constraints. This alternative is specially interesting since 
Bergemann and Morris (2005) has shown it to be equivalent to robust implementation.
Note, however, that the study of second best efficiency subject to ex post incentive 
compatible constraints presents one additional difficulty. Second best efficiency requires 
trading off between different inefficient allocations. Under Bayesian implementation 
the common prior assumption provides natural weights for the expected social surplus 
maximization. But this is not possible under ex post implementation. One alternative 
is to assume some ad hoc weights 7r, and define 7r-second best efficiency as the allocation 
that maximizes expected surplus defined according to 7r and subject to ex post incentive 
compatibility constraints. In this sense, it is remarkable that the allocations derived 
from our analysis satisfy the necessary conditions provided by Bikhchandani, Chatterji, 
and Sen (2006) for ex post implementability, and thus we would expect that our analysis 
characterizes 7r-second best efficiency.
A more appealing approach related to the analysis of robust implementation by 
Bergemann and Morris (2005) is to characterize mechanisms that maximize expected 
surplus subject to Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints for any common prior. 
Our results about English auctions provide a very small step in this direction since the 
English auction implements the second best independently of the prior. Note, however, 
that an assumption mantained in our analysis is that types are independent across 
bidders, and thus we can only derive that the English auction implements the second 
best for any common prior which is independent across bidders.
Chapter 5
Appendix
We illustrate in this appendix the claim in Footnote 13. We propose two examples. 
The first one is an asymmetric modification of Example 1: tq(si, S2) =  s i +  e +  2s2 and
s2V2 (si,S2 ) = S2+2si with e > 0 and small. Now, hi(s\) = — si+e, Hi(si) = —-£+csi, and
1 s2thus, Gi(si) = +  esi and gi(si) =  - 1  +  e. Similarly, h2(s2 ) =  —«2, # 2 (^2 ) =  —f ,
and thus, ^ 2 (^2) =  — and <72(^2 ) =  — 5 - As a consequence, Equation (4.6) becomes,
J  ]2 ( ( “ ^ + 251 + 2S2 +  €)  Pl W  + + 2S1 +  P2(s)^
The first integral is maximized by (pi(s),p2W) =  (0,0) a.e. if si +  «2 < \  — §, and 
(Pi(s)>P2 (a)) =  (1,0) a.e. otherwise. This allocation does not maximize the second 
integral since Qi(«i,p) is strictly increasing in si for ts G [0, \  — §].
The second example is a symmetric modification of Example 1: Vi(s) = Si +  (k + l)sj. 
k > 1. Now, hi(si) = —ksi, Hi(si) = - k ^ - ,  and thus, Gi(si) =  — and gi(s{) = — §. 
As a consequence, Equation (4.6) after integrating by parts the second integral becomes,
f  ( - 7; +  (* +  1)(*1 +52)^ (Pl{s) +  P2(s)) d,S-
J [0,ll2 \  1 Jr[o,i]:
_  rl
Q i(s i ,p )s i ( l  -  s i )d s i  Qi(ds i ,p) .E * /
i=l,2 J°
The maximization of the first integral requires that (pi(s),p2 (s)) = (0,0) if «i +  «2 <
2('ah-i'3", an<^  otherwise, that p i ( s )  +P 2 (s) =  1? a,.e. For k sufficiently large any allocation
that satisfies these conditions does not maximize the second integral. To see why, note
2
that in the limit as k tends to infinity the first condition implies: A) Qi{s^p) < y  and 
the second condition either Bl) ^*= 1,2 QiiX/^P) >) or B2) V«, Q i ( x ,p ) =  0 if x < 1/2
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and Qi(x ,p )  > fo- */2)2 otherwise. We shall show that an allocation that satisfies either 
A) and Bl) or A) and B2) implies that the second integral is strictly negative. We start 
with A) and B l), let pi =  Q i(l/2,p), then,
[  Qi(si,p)si(l -  Si)dsi <
Jo
rl/2 s2 rl rl
/ min{-^-, pi}si( 1 -  si) dsi +  / piSi(l -  Si) dsi < / msi(l -  Si) dsi = 0.
J o  J  J 1/2 Jo
Next, consider A) and B2),
/  Qi(si,p)si( 1 -  si) dsi =  / Qi{si,p)si( 1 -  Si) dsi <  0.
J o  J 1/2
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